Welcome to the November issue of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’s (ACLED) Conflict Trends report. Each month, ACLED researchers gather, analyse and publish data on political violence in Africa in realtime. Weekly updates to realtime conflict event data are published on the ACLED website, and are also available through our research partners at Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS).

This month’s issue focuses on the diffusion of protests in Algeria amidst elite corruption, State of Sinai activity and parliamentary elections in Egypt, intra-party political violence in Guinea, a sharp increase in political contestation in Republic of Congo following President Denis SassouNguesso’s constitutional amendment to term limits, demonstrations over university fees in South Africa and heightened protest activity related to the 2016 elections in Uganda. A Special Focus Topic explores the effect of income and investment on inducing political conflict.

Elsewhere on the continent, violence continued to decrease in Burundi and Libya, whilst clashes between Ethiopian troops and the Ogaden National Liberation Army (ONLA) continued in Ethiopia.

Figure 1: Conflict Events and Reported Fatalities by Country, May - October 2015.

ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and actors. Further information and maps, data, trends and publications can be found at www.acleddata.com or by contacting info.africa@acleddata.com. Follow @ACLEDblog on Twitter for realtime updates, news and analysis.
While Algeria's active role in the Malian and Libyan crises confirms its regional and international engagement, conflict dynamics point to the increasing vulnerability of its domestic economic and security prospects (International Crisis Group, 12 October 2015).

Over the last two months, northern Algeria experienced a series of service-delivery protests that saw local communities denouncing a lack of public services and marginalisation of rural areas. Although conflict levels have not risen significantly in absolute terms compared to previous periods (see Figure 2), the diffusion of protests reflects widespread popular discontent with the socioeconomic situation and the country's ruling elites, the pouvoir. However, protest events remained spontaneous and short-lived despite persisting contestation, proving that the absence of strong socio-political networks, such as trade unions and parties, constitutes an important obstacle to wider mobilisation.

Worsening macroeconomic trends present an additional challenge to the Algerian government. In September, Algeria’s trade deficit rose up to 10.33 billion dollars, compared to 4 billion in the same period last year, 6 billion in May and 8 billion in July (Jeune Afrique, 21 October 2015). The economy is affected by falling hydrocarbons exports, which constitute the 95% of all Algerian exports and have decreased by 41.41% since January. The wave of unrest that followed the economic crisis of mid-1980s suggests that political stability will ultimately hinge on the government's ability to address the economic crisis and promote social development.

CONFLICT TRENDS (NO. 43)
REAL-TIME ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, NOVEMBER 2015
Despite a dramatic decrease in insurgent activity in North Sinai through October (see Figure 3), the Islamic State affiliate group ‘State of Sinai’ have claimed responsibility for downing a Russian passenger plane on 31 October. Although several rival statements have thrown the validity of the Islamic State’s claim into question – two days after the crash, the Russian airline Kogalymavia denied the possibility of technical failure or human error (Egypt Independent, 2 November 2015) and speculation of IS involvement continues to grow (The Telegraph, 3 November 2015; Xinhuanet, 5 November 2015). If the State of Sinai’s claim is substantiated, this represents a significant escalation of violence and transformation in strategy since 1 July, after attempts to seize territory in Sheikh Zuweyid left 21 soldiers dead.

This change in tactic may represent a more wholesale rebranding of the Wilayat Sinai and a departure from the logic underlying its use of violence in the previous year. The majority of attacks in the towns of Al-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuweyid often posed a direct rebuke of the Egyptian government’s aggressive response to demonstrators and sustained targeting of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates across Cairo and other large cities. Small-scale, tit-for-tat, and diffuse incursions targeted security checkpoints and the vehicles of police conscripts and army generals who were mostly off-duty. These sorties generally focused on inflicting damage in a ‘hit-and-run’, assassination-style fashion to express contempt for President Sisi’s draconian measures. For this reason, the violence until now has remained centred upon national policy grievances, linking a peripheral insurgency to urban mobilization and protest.

But with the overt attempt to capture territorial outposts in the attacks on 1-2 July and with the possibility that last Saturday’s plane crash was a deliberate attack on civilian targets, further support is given to Zack Gold’s assessment of a shift to sustained urban warfare (The Financial Times, 1 July 2015) and a possible internationalization of the conflict. Major General Mohamed Ali Belal commented on the intense two-week offensive conducted by the military that began on 6 September, saying that “a comprehensive campaign has been launched based on an estimation of the situation and fresh information about many hideouts and targets” (Al Ahram Online, 8 September 2015). This two-phase ‘Martyr’s Right’ operation sought to eliminate
all militant threat from North Sinai and create conditions for infrastructural development in the peninsula. However, coupled with Major General Mohamed Ali Belal’s comments it seems to signal a more concentrated coordination between the Islamic State leadership and its regional partner in Egypt that has prompted serious engagement from the Egyptian military.

This month also saw the first round of Egypt’s parliamentary elections take place through 17-19 October, with a low turn-out of 26.56% in the first round (The Washington Post, 30 October 2015) and with violence surrounding the electoral process kept to a minimum. Minor episodes of violence were recorded in October with low-levels of protest held in large towns and cities by the pro-Morsi Anti-Coup Alliance (ACA) (see Figure 4). Other threats of election sabotage were dealt with swiftly and contained by security services, with 16% of all political violence in October related to the elections. Voter fatigue, lack of political competition and a complex voting system account for poor attendance and falling participation in the current elections, which may help elucidate why widespread electoral violence failed to proliferate. Numerous presidential, parliamentary and constitutional referendums since 2011 are believed to have worn voter enthusiasm for participation down.

With the success of the ‘For the Love of Egypt’ coalition in the first round of voting, it becomes evident that little has changed from the authoritarian electoral politics under Mubarak. The absence of parties competing on ideological platforms is indicative of that fact that “votes are not cast on the basis of political issues or party platforms but as a choice between competing personalities within a context of patron-client relations” (Zaki 1995: 101). ‘For the Love of Egypt’ coalition won all 60 seats in the first round of voting across 14 governorates, despite the fact that the 10 parties comprising it do not have a unified political philosophy. As a result, the closed party lists have enabled previous National Democratic Party (NDP) members and Mubarak-era candidates to secure nearly 30% of the seats (Egypt Independent, 29 October 2015).

The initial success of the pro-Sisi ‘For the Love of Egypt’ bloc confirms two features of Egyptian politics. Firstly, elections are far from providing a path to democracy, rather a carefully engineered return to managed rule that minimises political competition. Secondly, Egyptian politics has become increasingly de-politicised and impotent...
However, these turnout rates are not substantially different to those of 2008 and 2000, indicating that the role of elections in Egyptian life needs to be re-theorised to understand its performance, particularly in light of the traditional clientelistic transactions that feature in sub-Saharan African elections. Voters and constituencies are neither mobilizing on a large scale nor receiving substantial service delivery. Therefore, the idea of candidates as intermediaries between state and population, nor free-rider explanations capture the dynamics at play in Egypt. As Brownlee (2011) notes, Egypt may represent a case where non-electoral mechanisms of power are more pertinent. In which case, low turnout and apparent voter apathy should not be interpreted as a result of a moribund civilian base, rather an impotent and poorly institutionalized voting system.

Thus, whilst immediate violence surrounding these elections has been contained, lack of electoral participation may not signal a decline in organized violence or protest in the coming months. Rather, the increasing number of protests over the past three months (Egypt Independent, 18 October 2015) (see Figure 5) may signal a shift in the rules of the game in which protests take a more central role through ‘politics by other means’.

Figure 5: Number of Conflict Events by Rioters or Protesters in Egypt, from January - October 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Rioters</th>
<th>Protesters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Guinea witnessed a dramatic spike in political unrest in October with levels of political violence surpassing those seen during the depth of the Ebola crisis. The primary cause of this instability is the presidential election, which took place on 11 October, which pitted incumbent Alpha Conde with long-time challenger Cellou Dalein Diallo. Conde and his Rally of the Guinean People party (RPG) won 57.9% while Diallo and the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UDFG) won only 31.4% of the vote (Africa Confidential, 23 October 2015).

Much of the violence occurred in the immediate run-up to the election with most of the fatal violence resulting from clashes between UDFG and RPG supporters. In contrast, the police maintained a degree of impartiality and used strong-arm tactics to disperse rioters affiliated with both the ruling party and the opposition.

Spikes in violence were seen after the elections in 2010 when Conde won the presidency and took power from the National Council for Democracy and Development military junta. During the first round of elections, Diallo secured 43.69% of the vote while Conde only attracted 18.25%. Conde won the second round with 52.5%. This dramatic turn-around was due to Conde’s formation of an unwieldy 116-party coalition (Africa Confidential, 22 October 2015). However the result remained controversial with Diallo mounting a legal challenge and alleging fraud.

Violence also accompanied the 2013 legislative elections when Conde’s contracting of a South African software company to revise the voter’s register prompted the opposition to riot and accuse the president of doctoring the voter register (BBC News, 20 September 2013).

Similar accusations arose this month with the opposition accusing Conde of manipulating the voter register in order to take advantage of Guinea’s regional voting patterns. Conde is a Malinke and repeatedly secures support in Upper Guinea, while Diallo, a Peul, receives strong support in Middle Guinea (Africa Confidential, 23 October 2015). The opposition accused Conde of inflating the voter role in his safe constituencies while ensuring small constituencies in pro-Diallo regions (ibid.).

The areas in which the UDFG hold sway, Middle Guinea and parts of Conakry, were hit by anti-regime demonstrations and political violence during the 2010 presidential elections and the 2013 legislative elections (see Figure 6). However, this year differs from previous years with most fatal violence taking place in Guinea’s second city, N’Zerekore, in the Forestière region. N’Zerekore has dealt with deadly violence before with ethnic clashes between the Konianke and Guerze in July 2013 leading to numerous death. However, the expansion of electoral violence to this region may be due to prominent Forestière politicians, including former junta leader Moussa Dadis Camara and minister Jean-Marc Telliano, allying with the opposition (Africa Confidential, 23 October 2015).

![Figure 6: Number of Conflict Events and Electoral Contests in Guinea, from November 2010 - October 2015.](image-url)
Although less violent than the events in Burkina Faso and Burundi, the protests which broke out in the Republic of Congo shared many similar characteristics. These include a relatively peaceful amplification of the demonstrations, followed by a climax which included significant violence used by the security forces. During the most violent day of protests on 20 October, clashes between demonstrators and the security forces in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire resulted in 4 deaths. Security forces, allegedly backed by members of the Ninja paramilitary group who helped bring the current president to power, opened fire on the demonstrators (Al Jazeera, 20 October 2015). It was also reported that Radio France Internationale’s transmission signal cut, and internet and SMS services went down at 6:00am that day (Reporters Without Borders, 23 October 2015).

In the Republic of Congo, President Denis Sassou Nguesso announced in September that a constitutional referendum would be held on 25 October, which would allow him to run for a third term (Daily Nation, 6 October 2015). Following this decision, opposition and civil society groups mobilized to oppose the changes (Voice of America, 24 September 2015); as a result, October is one of the most violent months in the Republic of Congo since 2002 (see Figure 7). This spike was dominated by riots and protests occurring almost exclusively in the country’s two largest cities of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire.

But the Republic of Congo seems to have avoided a prolonged bout of destabilizing violence. The referendum held and passed on 25 October was without major disturbances, allegedly garnering 92% of the vote with a turnout of 72%. The figures were not verified independently (Reuters, 27 October 2015) and remain disputed by the opposition, who boycotted the polls. The question now is whether, having passed the hurdle of the referendum, the Republic of Congo has merely delayed further violence until the start of the presidential elections in 2016.
Levels of political unrest in South Africa decreased slightly in October. However, South Africa witnessed the highest levels of political unrest in mid-October since the country was hit with a series of xenophobic riots in April 2015. This spike in political conflict is due to protests by university students throughout the country against increasing university fees.

Universities were centres of political protest throughout 2015, with students at the University of Cape Town demonstrating against the university’s statue of Cecil Rhodes in the highly publicised ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ campaign; and students at Stellenbosch University demanding that lectures be taught in English rather than Afrikaans under the banner ‘Open Stellenbosch’ (Rhodes Must Fall, 2015; Shabangu, 28 August 2015). Both movements function as expressions of the frustration that many young South Africans, including the ‘Born Free’ generation, feel with the current political arrangement in the country. ‘Rhodes Must Fall’ and ‘Open Stellenbosch’ are primarily concerned with attacking the remnants of the colonial and apartheid era that remain in the public domain.

In contrast, the demands made during the recent demonstrations have been largely economic in nature. University fees have increased repeatedly and the recent protests were sparked by some universities proposing rises of more than 10%: close to twice the rate of inflation (Hall, 29 October 2015).

Furthermore, the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) announced at the beginning of the academic year that there are not sufficient funds to support all qualifying students, leaving an estimated 20,000 without financial assistance (ibid.). The demonstrations over fees have been dramatically more violent than the earlier protests over cultural icons and social transformation with the recent demonstrations involving more riots, clashes with police or security staff and violence against civilians (see Figure 8).

The reason for this may be the proven effectiveness of violence in service-delivery riots. Demonstrators often resort to destructive tactics after peaceful protest has failed to win the attention of the authorities. Increasingly, dissatisfied groups in South Africa see such tactics as the only method of ensuring that they are not ignored by the government (Mudzuli, 5 February 2015).

The use of violence by student demonstrators has proven effective. Education Minister Blade Nzimande originally offered to impose a 6% cap on tuition fees, putting the increases roughly in line with inflation. The students refused the offer as insufficient and continued rioting forced President Zuma into announcing that there would be no increases in university tuition fees for the next academic year (BBC News, 23 October 2015).

This announcement has not ended the student protests but rather signalled to the protesters the power they hold over central government. Students have continued to demonstrate and have upped their demands to include the cancelling of student debt and free education.
Uganda has seen a steady increase in violence and protest throughout 2015, peaking in October with 46 events reported. October also saw nearly twice the number of conflict events as the second-most active month in 2015 (24 total events were reported in July) (see Figure 9), and each month had six conflict-related fatalities (see Figure 9). The recent spike in protests and violence is associated with the start of campaigns and primaries for presidential elections to be held in early 2016.

Riots and protests connected to police brutality and suppression of opposition rallies constituted 78% of all violence this month. The majority of riots and protests occurred in the western district of Karabole, the southwestern district of Isingiro, and in central districts of Masaka, Luwero, and Kampala (see Figure 10). On 15 October, ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) supporters protested in Masaka, Sembabule, and Mbarara, alleging rigged voting in the primaries. On the same day in Butaleja, two NRM supporters were reportedly hacked to death by opposition supporters. On 21 October, at least 15 people were injured in clashes between supporters of rival MP candidates in Tororo District. On 27 October, police assaulted a journalist in Lwengo for covering a story on election fraud. Most recently, on 29 October, a journalist was shot in the head at Bulera police station in Mityana District.

President Yoweri Museveni heads into the 2016 elections having ruled since 1986, and lifted presidential term limits through a constitutional amendment in 2005. Standing in the way of his fifth term is a slew of defectors turned political challengers, as well as accusations of police brutality against opposition voices (Human Rights Watch, 18 October 2015). In September 2015, police clashed with supporters of former NRM Secretary General Amama Mbabazi at rallies in Soroti and Jinja. Dozens of the protesters and rioters were injured by rubber bullets and tear gas (Human Rights Watch, 18 October 2015). Once seen as a natural successor to Museveni, Mbabazi’s “fall from grace” and dismissal as Prime Minister in September 2014 was triggered his rumoured presidential ambitions (African Arguments, 29 June 2015). In 2015, Mbabazi defected from NRM and formed the Go Forward Campaign where the allied opposition nominated him as a presidential candidate (The Monitor, 3 November 2015). Another political challenger, Kizza Besigye, has been repeatedly arrested in 2015. In October, police beat Besigye and his staff during a Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) rally in Rukungiri District. A female staff member was stripped naked by police and thrown into a truck, sparking anger over police misconduct towards women (Voice of America, 13 October 2015).

Despite increased election-based violence in the Western and Central Regions, the Northern Region has remained relatively calm. Once the scene of abductions and torture by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the 1990s and 2000s, the northern areas experienced just four incidents of violence against civilians in 2015 (see Figure 10).
In early January, LRA senior commander and International Criminal Court (ICC) indictee Dominic Ongwen surrendered/was captured in Central African Republic (CAR) and was extradited to The Hague (BBC News, 7 January 2015). Since 2006, LRA operations have moved into Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and CAR. Although rebel accountability is crucial, sentiment is also strong that the ICC has been “inadvertently promoting the government’s narrative of the conflict,” with the LRA as ‘terrorists’ and the government as ‘protector’ (African Arguments, 10 February 2015). The government’s forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians into “protection camps” during the LRA war has had a last negative impact. In April 2015, Acholi tribesmen, who settled in Apaa after being forcibly displaced by LRA fighting, protested against land grabbing and talks of a new boundary between Amuru and Adjumani Districts (Radio France Internationale, 19 April 2015). With the land supposedly belonging to the Uganda Wildlife Authority as a game reserve, Acholi protesters were being evicted from their ancestral land for a second time (Radio France Internationale, 19 April 2015). As recently as 7 September, five people were shot and seriously injured in related clashes between police and protesters in Pabo.

With riots, protests, and violence against opposition voices increasing as 2015 draws to a close, the start of 2016 will see Museveni fending off challenges to his continued rule. Meanwhile, Ongwen will face his confirmation of charges hearing in the ICC, scheduled for January. Time will tell whether a possible change in presidency and the potential prosecution of a rebel leader may bring about a more peaceful year for Uganda.
Strong state capacity is difficult to attain in low-income countries where the state lacks access to resources to aid in effectively implementing policies. As a result, incomes are often used as a proxy measurement to determine the strength of state capacity, and states with lower incomes experience some of the highest levels of conflict (see: Dix- on, 2009). Yet, efforts at alleviating poverty including aid (Nunn & Qian, 2014), foreign direct investment (FDI) (Nigh and Schollhammer, 1987) or resource rents (Ross, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Béland & Tiagi, 2009) can also induce conflict through fostering dependence, grievances, or greed in would-be rebels.

Using income and investment data from the World Bank Development Indicators, and aid data from the AidData project, the effect of sources of income on future conflict and violence in Africa is assessed. The presence of resources are associated with increased violence rates; the ‘resource curse’ suggests that natural resources makes the ‘prize’ of the state more attractive to rebels (for example, see Humphreys, 2005). While Libya and DR-Congo – where natural resource rents make up a significant portion of each state’s GDP – see much conflict activity, other states that also rely significantly on natural resource exports – such as Mauritania, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo – do not exhibit the same conflict activity, suggesting that this greed-based hypothesis may not solely describe conflict dynamics in Africa (see Figure 11).

Many argue that oil rents are especially deleterious (for example, see: Ross, 2004; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). The relatively high levels of conflict in Libya – coupled with the fact that oil rents make up a significant proportion of its GDP – seem to corroborate this. However, other states that also rely heavily on oil rents – such as the Republic of Congo, Angola, or Equatorial Guinea – do not exhibit this same propensity toward conflict, but clearly indicate that resources are associated with autocratic politics. Aid assists post-conflict states, but it also may play a role in creating conflict. Some studies find that increased aid decreased civil conflict duration (De Ree & Nillesen, 2009), other that increases the risk and duration (Nunn and Qian, 2014). Conflict may increase when the state has more access to aid. Kishi and Raleigh (2015) find that increased access to Chinese aid heightens state repression in the form of battles and bombings including state forces and the targeting of civilian forces by the state. By securing access to income that it can use as it sees fit, the state is able to capitalize on this increased access to resources to secure its authority and suppress opponents and competition. In line with this finding, Nigeria and Egypt – two countries that rely significantly on aid inflows from China – show intense conflict activity.

Investment too can impact the conflict topography of a state as the state and elites may seek to create and maintain specific environments in order to attract investors. Nigh and Schollhammer (1987) observe a positive correlation between FDI inflows and intrastate conflict, though examples such as Mozambique and Liberia, where FDI dependence is higher, do not exhibit intense violence. It may be the case that increased FDI minimizes the risk of conflict (Bussmann, 2010), which could point to why states combatting prolonged crises – such as DR-Congo and the Sudan – see minimal FDI inflows (see Figure 12). In a new working paper, Raleigh and Kishi find that different sources of income incentivize variations in state predatory behavior. Because African states are more beholden

**Figure 11: Natural Resource Rents and Number of Conflict Events in Africa, in 2014.**
to external economic providers over internal income generation through taxes, etc., the dominant forms of external economic flows can create environments where state violence is more likely.

For more on the impact of sources of income on conflict across the African continent—as well as how various other mechanisms may shape conflict patterns and dynamics in Africa—see the Informed Humanitarian: a resource for practitioners and policymakers.

Figure 12: Foreign Direct Investment and Number of Conflict Events by Type in Africa, in 2014.