ACLED is a publicly available database of political violence, which focuses on conflict in African and Asian states. Data is geo-referenced and disaggregated by type of violence and actors. Information, maps, data, publications and sources can be found at www.crisis.acleddata.com. Please contact acledinfo@acleddata.com or acledasia@gmail.com (@acledinfo) with any questions.

Welcome to the first trend report for ACLED Asia. In these periodic publications, the ACLED Asia team will discuss and analyze the real-time conflict event trends that are occurring throughout South and South-East Asia. ACLED Asia will release real-time data for eleven states with various conflict profiles. These states include India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar. See Figure 1. Data for January and February 2015 are now available from the CEPSA website and the ACLED website.

Real-time data will be released by month, while the ACLED Asia team continues to collect backdated information for all states. A schedule for available backdated information will be released in the coming month. Several states will have coverage from 1997-present, while others will have conflict events coded from 2010-present for the initial round of backdating. See Figure 2.

ACLED Asia data are compatible with all ACLED data, found on the project website. A shared codebook, general user guide, definitions for political violence, methodology page, guide for humanitarian users and practitioners, user guide for media, descriptions of data management practices, discussions of data collection practices and comparisons are available. Working papers on sourcing materials and actor types are also available.

The ACLED project differs from available information on South and Southeast Asia in numerous and significant ways: it records the “who, what, when, where and how many” for conflict events; it is released consistently and collects information in real-time; it collects information on a wide range of political violence, from protests to drone attacks, in order to capture the ways in which communities experience instability and risk; it contains information that is directly comparable across different contexts, countries, over time and between conflicts; it collects in-
This trend report will discuss the conflict profile of *Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh* and *Sri Lanka*. A short piece on the resource riots and morality protests in India accompanies a brief, concluding piece on the differences between African and Asian conflict environments. Upcoming trend reports will discuss Indian conflict environments, and those within South East Asia.

**Conflict Environments by Country**

South and South Asia are host to a range of political violence, with variable fatality rates, goals, levels of necessary collective action, and community support. Below is a brief review of the types of political violence expected to predominantly occur within states. The ACLED team has summarized the main conflict fault lines across Asian states that will characterize event data in the near future.
The political climate in Pakistan is distinct to administrative and ethnic districts, and characterized by local competition between violent political groups, across which the activity of formal state forces is clustered in FATA. FATA experiences up to 50% of all politically violent acts in Pakistan and accounts for 67% of total fatalities. Neighbouring areas to FATA all experience some exposure to the competition. Riots and protests between regional political parties are common across the state, as is sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia, which is frequent in both rural and urban areas. See Figure 3.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a semi-autonomous region bordering Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa (KPK) in Pakistan. The area is governed primarily through local tribal traditions, with historically loose but influential ties to the centre. FATA is home to most militant activity in Pakistan, with Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-i-Islam (LI), Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Haqqani Network and Jamaatul Ahrar among the many militant groups that find safe haven in the locally administered mountainous region. Sharing a porous border with Afghanistan gives militant groups space to manoeuvre in and out of the country with relative ease compared to other areas. In particular, the Haqqani Network and Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group are Islamist groups borne from remnants from the Mujahedeen of the Soviet Invasion 1979. They have historical links with intelligence agencies in Pakistan, however under a current military operation ‘Zarb-e-Azb’ (begun on June 14th, 2014), hideouts of these groups are being targeted. This development is a trend to follow as the operation is still underway.

Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa is one of the four main provinces in Pakistan, and one of two neighbouring FATA. KPK has a population of 21 million, the majority of which are Pashtun, which is also the majority ethnicity of those in the tribal regions and in the neighbouring provinces of Afghanistan. This ethnic link is one possible explanation for the militancy in the AfPak region, and is often cited as the main reason militant groups find safe havens in the area. The link with Pashtun culture, identity and militancy in the region is not definitive in KPK -- it is the province most affected by attacks from militant groups. In the last quarter of 2014 alone, 197 people were killed in KPK, 172 of those deaths being caused by acts of violence perpetrated by militant groups.

Figure 3: Number of battles by type in Pakistan, November 2014-February 2015.
Pakistan

Being in such close proximity to FATA, KPK becomes an easy target for militants and is seen to be the main battleground to exert their presence on the civilian population of Pakistan. The civilian population is opposed to militant oppression, and the retribution for defiance as well as the accessibility of the area, means that while Zarb-e-Azb is being fought in the tribal belt, the civilian population most gravely feels the after-effects in KPK.

Most small-scale attacks are perpetrated by ‘Unidentified Armed Groups’, however, organized large scale attacks, including coordinated bomb attacks, or militant infiltrations into schools, are conducted by three major groups, Jamaatul Ahrar, TTP, and LI (each group claims responsibility for attacks through social media and other outlets).

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province with the lowest population density. With less than 5% of the population living in such a vast landscape, the region is loosely governed through a ‘Levies Force’ which functions like a local, outsourced army for the centre. Balochistan borders all four of Pakistan’s main provinces, and FATA.

Two main conflict actor types are present in Balochistan. The first are rebel and militant forces from FATA and KPK who find another major rear base in Balochistan, as land is often inaccessible via regular transport. In particular, Balochistan offers extensive cover for TTP militants, and the Jandallah group. Jandallah is a militant organization based in Balochistan but it began as a movement for Sunni rights in Iran. In Pakistan, the group historically holds ties with the TTP, but in 2014 it declared allegiance with ISIS.

Militant groups use Balochistan as a safe haven to attack police check-posts, and also to frequently attack members of the Hazara Shia community who predominantly live in Quetta. Targeted killings and sectarian violence also runs rife in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan.

The second main type of conflict actor is an armed secessionist movement fighting for Balochi independence. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is a movement that gained significant traction in 2003 and attacks central state outlets in the region, such as army checkpoints and government buildings and officials. In the closing quarter of 2014, separatist attacks were fewer in number than attacks by TTP and Jandallah, who took aim at Shia targets, state elements such as police check-posts and judges, and politicians.

Sindh is the third of Pakistan’s four main provinces, and is home to Karachi, Pakistan’s only major financial hub. Political activity in Sindh is diverse, and primarily divided along rural and urban lines. Rural Sindh is feudal in nature, and political activity in the region is dominated by allegiances to political parties, predominantly the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F). In addition to these two active parties, rural Sindh is influenced heavily by left-wing political parties. These groups are not as active in parliament, but have a strong union and public presence, creating an environment of political accountability through staging regular protests. The PPP and JUI-F both have presence in urban Sindh, but are often overshadowed by the strong rivalry between the Muttahida-Qaumi-Movement (MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP). In addition to turf wars between political parties, urban Sindh is also affected by militant Islamist groups for which Karachi is another hub. Aligning with criminal gangs in the city who provide cover, TTP militants have a strong presence in Karachi, with attacks on political leaders who are vocally against the TTP, as well as on police forces who often retaliate.

In addition to large nationalist parties and smaller left leaning parties, rural Sindh also has a sizable quantity of political movements that call for the secession of Sindh from Pakistan. This environment of political activism in the region makes Sindh a province with high rates of political activity and protest engagement. In the last quarter of 2014, there were 128 reported protests in Sindh.
Pakistan

**Punjab** is the fourth main province in Pakistan; it is the second largest in regards to landmass, and over half of Pakistan’s population resides there. The region remains a stronghold of the government, with militant activity kept at bay. However, some political violence attributed to the TTP and its splinter group Jamaatul Ahrar does infiltrate the province. Despite being politically stable, there are strong rivalries between parties in the region that can often erupt into riots. The current party in power, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML (N)) has its stronghold in Punjab, and often clashes with protesters from members of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), a political party that questions the results of the last elections.

Islamabad experienced several protests since the beginning of the year, but remained calm. Most of the protests were staged against various killings in the country, including the deadly attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar last December.

**Gilgit/Baltistan** is a relatively new administrative unit in Pakistan, and is an autonomous region that is peripheral and difficult to access. Due to a sparse and remote population, the region has few events of national political importance. The main local political issue is sectarian violence, with a Shi’ite minority being the target of attacks from Sunni activists in the region. In the last quarter of 2014, sectarian violence between two religious student groups resulted in two deaths in the area. This was the only reported politically violent event in the area in the last quarter of 2014, making up less than 1% of the violent activity in Pakistan.

Separately, in **Jammu and Kashmir**, 2015 started with continued firing across the Line of Control. Over 30 security forces and civilians were reported killed and more than 10,000 villagers were displaced during the first two months of the year. Jammu and Kashmir also witnessed riots and protests against the killing of civilians, the Indian attempt to settle non-Kashmiris, as well as to commemorate the anniversaries of the Gawkada massacre and the Kupwara killings in 1990 and 1994 respectively. The majority of the reported events happened on the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh

**Bangladesh**: In the days leading up to the one year anniversary of the January 2014 elections, violence against opposition parties and general political violence soared.

High levels of violent partisan confrontation is due to inter-party clashes between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), as well as intra-party infighting. These disputes and clashes often involve party student and youth wings.

Protests and riots are the main form of political action in Bangladesh; riots include vandalism, the explosion of crude bombs, and clashes between rioters, as well as between rioters and the police. Further, some battles across different political and communal groups are captured in the recent period. In total, over 90 killings and hundreds of injuries are reported for the last quarter.

In December 2008, the Awami League (AL) led by Sheikh Hasina, won an election that put an end to a two-year military-backed caretaker government. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government has been marked by high level of corruption, partisan bureaucracy and a worsening human rights record. Disillusion manifest in severe violence that accompanied the January 2014 elections, leaving hundreds dead and injured, as well as by the continued use of force, arbitrary arrests, and censorship to repress its opposition. PM Hasina ruled out the possibility of mid-term elections; in response, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) announced mass demonstrations against the ruling government; those occurred through the end of 2014 and into 2015.

The BNP previously struggled to mobilize this mass movement, in part because authorities continue to deny permission to hold rallies. In November, BNP clashed with the police in Dhaka and Gazipur city, injuring at least 50 people. Later in December, the BNP-led 20 party alliance called for a nationwide hartal, protesting the foiling of its scheduled rally and demanded the release of its arrested senior leaders. Although mostly peaceful, a female teacher was killed and six people injured when hartal supporters, including Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD), the student-wing of BNP, turned violent and set off crude bombs in the city area on the 24th of November. During the days running up to the one year anniversary of the elections of 5 January 2014, hundreds of opposition activists, including from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami Party, were rounded up and arrested across the country. This government crackdown has come in response to opposition protests on the anniversary of con-
troversial national polls, which the BNP boycotted and from which Jamaat was excluded.

Sri Lanka has recently ended an extended civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2009. The civil war ended through military defeat of the Tamil Tigers/LTTE. Estimates of fatalities are between 80,000 and 100,000, and the country suffered from extensively development declines, internal displacement and societal damage.

The political environment since the end of the civil war is characterized by a debates over the form and extent of Sinhalese central governance, with political parties advocating a federal and devolved solution. Protests and riots are the most common form of political activity recorded by ACLED. The last quarter experienced over 60 riots and protests. Although present, in most cases the police did not intervene. Two cases of violence against civilians resulted in death, out of which one was directly related to the upcoming elections.

Presidential elections on 8 January resulted in the overthrow of President Rajapaka, who faced a strong and successful opposition coalition led by Maithripala Sirisena, general secretary of president Rajapaka’s own Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and unified by the desire to remove Rajapaka. Sirisena was supported by the major opposition United National Party (UNP) as well as numerous smaller parties, including the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the leftist-nationalist People’s Liberation Front (JVP), Sri Lanka’s main Muslim parties—the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) (Xinhua, December 28, 2015), and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA)—though without any formal endorsement (CrisisGroup, December 9, 2014). The vote of the Muslim minority at 10% of Sri Lanka’s 20.4 million population, and the Tamil population at 12%, are critical in presidential elections.

The existence of a unified opposition and its common candidate Maithripala Sirisena led to an increased fear of election violence and restrictions on campaigning. Since Sirisena’s announcement, at least a dozen violent attacks on supporters were reported. The Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) report complaints of 83 major incidents and 58 minor incidents, 11 cases involving firearms, 2 cases of attempted murder, 26 cases of assault, 4 cases of arson, 6 cases of damage to property and 39 cases of misuse of state resources.

Figure 5: Number of events and fatalities in Bangladesh by week, October 2014-February 2015.
Nepal experienced a civil war from 1996-2006 where a rebel group claiming Maoist beliefs fought with a fractured government. This war mainly took place in rural areas, whilst the government remained in control of the main cities and towns, and led to an estimated 15,000 fatalities. The war ended through the Comprehensive Peace Accord in November 2006.

Under this accord, the Maoists are allowed to take part in the government in exchange for disarming and reintegrating their fighters. Tensions between the Maoists and other political groups, however, continue to spark widespread protests, strikes and violent clashes.

Protests are the current main form of political action in Nepal that is captured by ACLED. In the past quarter, protests took place all across Nepal with a concentration in the Eastern Region. Although several protests were directly related to the ongoing constitution drafting process, there are multiple motivations.

Elections for a new constituent assembly (CA) in Nepal took place in November 2013. The previous CA was dissolved in 2012, after four years (and multiple mandate extensions), during which it failed to reach consensus on the fundamental nature of the new Nepali republic or agree on a constitution.

Recent conflict and protests events largely concern the drafting of a constitution. Specifically, the federal structure and form of governance is under review. The ‘faultlines’ in these debates include the Nepali Congress (NC), the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the major opposition Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-M) (and supporters) who disagree on state restructuring, system of governance and the judicial system.

Figure 6: Number and type of events per country (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar), November 2014-February 2015.
Despite government overtures of peace toward ethnic armed groups in recent months, conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces and three major armed groups—The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)—has increased. ACLED has recorded 291 fatalities related to these conflicts from November 2014 to February 2015. However, because of conflicting reports, it is likely this number is much higher. Several local and regional newspapers have expressed doubt that a successful comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the last non-signatory recognized ethnic armed groups will occur in the near future (Mizzima, February 23, 2015) (Democratic Voice of Burma, February 10, 2015) (Bangkok Post, February 20, 2015).

On November 19th, the Myanmar Armed Forces’ shelling of a Kachin Independence Army (KIA) training facility left 23 rebel trainees dead (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2014). The trainees belonged largely to KIA allies, particularly the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Arakan Army (AA), and the TNLA (The Irrawaddy, December 4, 2014). While the KIA engaged in occasional clashes with the Myanmar Armed Forces before this incident, the attack led to a steep escalation of violence. On January 14th, the Myanmar Army responded with force to reports of KIA troops detaining a Kachin State transportation minister and three Burmese police officers (Mizzima, January 20, 2015). While the minister and policemen were later released, fighting between the two sides continued. The KIA has not attended any ceasefire talks with the government since the November 19th shelling (The Irrawaddy, February 13, 2015).

On February 9th, fighting erupted between the MNDAA and the Myanmar Armed Forces in Laukkai (The Irrawaddy, February 13, 2015). As of the end of February the fighting has killed at least 144 Myanmar and MNDAA policemen and soldiers and over 100 civilians caught in the crossfire (Radio Free Asia, February 25, 2015). The TNLA and AA have been reported to be fighting alongside the MNDAA (Democratic Voice of Burma, February 10, 2015).

The Myanmar government also accuses the KIA and United Wa State Army (UWSA) of helping the MNDAA—a claim which these groups largely reject (The Irrawaddy, February 19, 2015); (The Irrawaddy, February 27, 2015).

On February 17th and 19th, unknown assailants fired upon Burmese Red Cross Convoys carrying refugees in the conflict area, injuring several civilians. Both the MNDAA and the Myanmar Armed Forces deny responsibility for these attacks (The Irrawaddy, February 23, 2015). The government claims it regained control of Laukkai on February 21st, but fighting in and around the city continues (Democratic Voice of Burma, March 2, 2015). The Republic of the Union of Myanmar has so far rejected all MNDAA calls to negotiate (Myanmar Times, March 8, 2015). The fighting between the MNDAA and Myanmar Armed Forces have also increased tensions between the Myanmar government and China—which the Myanmar government accuses of supplying weapons to the MNDAA (Radio Free Asia, February 26, 2015).

Fighting between the TNLA and the Myanmar Armed Forces spiked in late January when government troops and TNLA forces clashed in Shan State’s Nakham Township (The Irrawaddy, January 27, 2015). While what sparked the clash is unclear, the two forces continue to battle. The TNLA has often fought alongside the MNDAA and KIA in these armed groups’ respective battles against government forces.
Rallies and demonstrations over access to resources represent a significant amount of political activity in South and Southeast Asia. Between November 2014-February 2015, 119 instances of political violence reportedly concerned resource scarcity and resource politics. Local communities commonly objected to the absence of government subsidies to protect critical farming industries, artificially lowered prices, and the lack of resources to cultivate their crops. Protesters focused on problems surrounding sugarcane, cotton, water, fertilizer, milk, and land.

India is where most instances of resource-based political violence has occurred in the past four months. Ninety-four events occurred across central and north central states in India (Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Chandigarh) where protesters gathered to voice complaints regarding the newly passed Government Land Acquisition Act (active in January 2015). The Government Land Acquisition Act requires at least 70% of affected people in an area to agree to sell their land to the government. Farmers claimed the bill “empower[ed] the government to acquire fertile lands of farmers for its vested interests without the farmers’ consent” ([Hindustan Times, February 25, 2015](#)). All three states are largely dependent on agriculture as a livelihood.

Elsewhere, sugarcane prices fell in India and Pakistan, leading to numerous protests against what farmers see as government inaction to protect critical crops. Sugarcane farmers held twenty-two protests in the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka in the last three months, calling for an end to the Indian government’s price fixing of sugar which led to significant revenue loss for farmers. Demonstrators blocked highways, protested in front of government buildings, held relay-fast, and set up roadblocks to dispute the artificially low sugar prices.

Across the border, five protests took place in Pakistan over sugar prices. In Sindh and Punjab provinces, sugarcane millers held demonstrations to protest the govern-
Farmers in Thailand gathered twice in December and January to protest the declining prices of rice, encouraging the government to subsidize one of the major agricultural crops in the country. In Cambodia, on January 4th and 5th, farmers protested after officials burned down cottages the villagers built on disputed land, resulting in 500 farmers armed with axes and knives blocking the main road the following day. Agricultural issues continue to arise in southeast Asia, often times resulting in protests against the government and in some cases, violent clashes over access to resources.

Similarly, demonstrators turned out in Myanmar to voice concerns about the government’s reacquisition of land policies. Hundreds protested seemingly ‘random’ government reacquisition and demanded compensation for land distributed to private contractors (Reuters, December 22, 2014). In November, competition over access to land in Myanmar escalated when communal groups violently clashed over fishing rights in a local body of water. Two weeks later, two rival groups of the ruling Awami League again fought over water rights, leaving four wounded after gunfire erupted.

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The Rise of Hindu Fundamentalism?

A division between rising conservatism and rising liberalism is emerging in India, exemplified by the increasing number of protests, attacks, and riots occurring due to moral policing. “Kiss of Love” protests began as an act of organized defiance against the moral policing in Kerala, India on November 2, 2014. Activists organized the demonstration after a local television report showed a couple kissing at a café. Members of the ruling BJP’s student wing ransacked the café to condemn public displays of affection. Utilizing social media, students from across the district arranged to meet on November 8, 2014 and march together “to protest right-wing activists who see such public displays as a Western import that threatens India’s traditional culture” (India Gazette, November 26, 2014). A week earlier, pro-Hindu groups like Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) mobilized to prevent the “Kiss of Love” demonstrations from occurring in Kochi. On November 2, Hindu groups came “armed with canes to attack and forcefully remove the Kiss of Love protestors,” which resulted in several arrests and injuries (The Indian Express, November 3, 2014).

Figure 9 highlights the widespread protests of the “Kiss of Love” and the reactionary riots that occurred in the past months.

Rightwing groups like Shiv Sena have also declared that protests like the “Kiss of Love” are part of “love jihad”, a trend where rightwing groups claim that “muslims seduce Hindu girls with the aim of converting them to Islam”. This is perceived to be an existential threat to the Hindu majority nation of India (The Guardian, January 19, 2015). Hardline Hindu groups with close ties to the BJP are accused of forcible converting religious minorities (including both Muslims and Christians) (BBC, December 22, 2014). Other conservative groups have expressed outrage at attempts to convert Hindus to Islam, leading to violent confrontations and riots between community members in recent months and escalating intra-communal tensions between religious groups.

Bajrang Dal, “a particularly violent RSS affiliate implicated in everything from attacking young unmarried couples for holding hands to organizing riots and building bombs” (The Guardian, January 29, 2015) appeared en masse to thwart protests in Haryana, Dehli, Rajasthan, and Gujарат on December 30, 31, and January 1. Additionally, in November and December, Bajrang Dal rioters attacked movie theaters showing films portraying Hindus in “an unsavory light” and policed public areas in an attempt to prevent public displays of affection by hitting civilians with batons and canes.

Report of Resource Scarcey and Hindu Radicalism in South Asia

Upcoming Special Topic Trend Reports

June 5th
- Bangladeshi Hartel
- Burmese Armed Groups

September 4th
- Political Party Militias
- Asia Conflict Actors

December 4th
- Rioting in India and Pakistan
- Comparisons between ACLED Africa and ACLED Asia

ACLED Asia data and trends will be available from both the ACLED website (acleddata.com) and the Strauss Center Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia (CEPSA) page: https://www.strausscenter.org/acled.

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Sources

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Full details of sources and coding processes are available online on the ACLED website.