Leadership Survival and Hired Guns:
Repression, Counterbalancing, and Pro-Government Militias

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Abstract. This article presents a ‘violence management’ framework through which to understand why, where, and when states employ pro-government militias (PGMs). Fragile and developing regimes engage in practices of ‘violence management’ that involve both offensive and defensive strategies to contain, repress, and curtail various domestic threats. Some of these strategies include public repression, counterbalancing, the creation of paramilitary forces, and supporting PGMs to combat opponents within and outside the regime. The most ‘effective’ strategy for a leader to ensure his/her survival is to establish a combination of implementing PGMs, counterbalancing, and initiating state repression strategies. These different organizations and responses are specifically designed to deal with various types and scales of threat. However, PGMs are a relatively understudied phenomenon whose patterns of activity and allegiance we address here. A new pro-government militia dataset – PGM-Set – is introduced and is used to test the impact of combined PGM activity, repression, and counterbalancing on leadership survival.
Introduction

Across Africa, the average tenure of a leader is over 7 years, one of the highest in the world.¹ These leaders often face high rates of violent and non-violent opposition due to the longevity and presumed exclusive nature of rule. However, very few leaders are either violently overthrown or ‘voted out’ of leadership positions, and often use direct and indirect violence as part of a larger strategic plan to retain power in periods of competition.

Further, African states face a higher rate of domestic threats from non-violent demonstrations, armed opposition groups, and internal factions, compared to international risks.² Therefore, domestic ‘violence management’ shapes the structure of security: these practices refer to a range of strategies and agents employed to counter, repress, and contain the varied threats a government may face. For example, military forces actively battle armed groups operating within and outside national territories; while both police and military forces are employed to counteract and repress local, regional, and national threats in various forms, including insurgents, opposition parties, public protests, and threats from within.³ Previous research demonstrates how the use of repression by regimes can effectively curtail opposition from civil society, civilians, and external parties,⁴ and others have shown how regimes limit the risk of coups by ‘counterbalancing’⁵ their military and police forces.⁶⁷ Only recently have conflict scholars sought to understand and interpret a larger

⁵ Counterbalancing is defined as dividing a “country’s coercive power between multiple, overlapping security forces” in an effort to sap military morale and undermine effective battlefield coordination; this is often done by staffing the military with regime loyalists. (DeBruin, 2015:2). This is done in coup prevention, and can also be referred to as ‘divide and rule’ or ‘hedging’. Erica De Bruin, “Does Counterbalancing Work? Evidence From Developing States” in International Studies Association Annual Convention (2015:2).
⁷ Others have suggested that ministry dynamics provide a vital insight into domestic politics: for example, in cases where governments create multiple similar ministry positions, Arriola (2009) notes that this ‘ministry packing’ is a form of patronage and co-option, or ‘coup-proofing’, as regimes create formal and public alliances with different elites. Leonardo R. Arriola, ”The Political Alignment of Business in Africa." In APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. 2009. See also: Arthur
universe of armed actors – especially militias – who play a vital role in war and non-war periods of fragile, developing states.\(^8\)

This article offers a framework and data source through which to interpret and understand the emergence and use of pro-government militias – hereafter PGMs. These agents operate outside of formal forces, yet act in accordance with the needs and wishes of regimes. The use of PGMs follows a larger trend in political violence across developing states: political militias now represent the largest category of armed non-state agents, and their actions and proliferation has occurred in and for periods of domestic political instability, rather than civil war. Across African states from 1997 through 2014, 7% of civil war events are committed by PGMs, while over half of all militia activity outside of civil war periods is committed by PGMs.\(^9\) These trends are explained by changes in the overall composition and forms of violence: as civil war has declined across African states,\(^10\) the political environment has become populated with armed groups with specific ‘political competition’ objectives. Recent research has confirmed that these groups engage more often as proxy forces for political elite competition over the terms of inclusion within government, rather than exclusion or marginalization faced by large ethno-regional communities.\(^11\) A regime’s use of PGMs is explained by this logic: these non-state groups contest other armed political groups created to advance the agenda of non-state elites.\(^12\) Increasingly, regimes rely on informal militias allied to regimes or other

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\(^9\) These statistics come from the new PGM dataset created by the authors for this research. The dataset will be introduced and explored in more detail below, within the Data and Research Design section of the paper.


\(^12\) Political militias are armed groups using violence or the threat of violence to influence an immediate political process; while they are rarely organized in a formal or rigid hierarchy, they are closely affiliated with a political elite patron who dictates the goals of violence (Raleigh, 2016). Examples of these militias include the Séléka militia in the Central African Republic, and RENAMO of Mozambique. Militias perform critical functions for the regime during war, and are active participants in crisis (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 2015), but they also exist in non-crisis situations. All manner of political elites – including but not limited to regimes – use militias (see Raleigh, 2016). Examples include political party militias (e.g. the Amal movement in Lebanon from the 1970s; the Anti-Balaka during the Djotodia presidency and after in the Central African Republic; the Badr organization in Iraq; the Mombasa Revolutionary Council in Kenya; the Unified Democratic Patriots Party in Tunisia), community militias (e.g. the Turkana militia in Kenya; the Mayi-Mayi in DR-Congo), and those affiliated with political elites and politicians (e.g. the Yau Yau militia of South Sudan and the
government figures to represent their interests in subnational conflicts; these proxy forces are highly localized and augment the role of regime forces, if necessary. The relationship explored here is that regime/leader longevity is contingent on managing multiple violence threats. Political violence is often expected, widespread, sufficiently diverse, and concurrent as to require multiple strategies. Those leaders who use PGMs do so in combination with other forms of violence management (repression and counterbalancing), and often successfully extend their tenure compared to those regimes that do not use PGMs.

Regimes and leaders have always used PGMs, despite the availability of an active military. In recent years, the rate and activity of this armed sub-group has increased, in line with democratic transitions and the associated use of armed militias by opposition groups and other political elites. PGMs and their activities are of concern as they constitute a grave threat to civilian safety generally: of all active militias operating on behalf of political elites (e.g. rebel leaders, politicians, political parties, warlords, military, government officials, etc.), those associated with the state have the most pervasive and negative impact on civilians. Over 10% more PGM conflict activity targets civilians relative to non-PGM militias; and these actions are more lethal relative to other militias. On average, each instance of civilian targeting by a PGM leads to three times more civilian deaths than those carried out by other militias.¹³

PGMs offer several attractive benefits to regimes:¹⁴ they are a flexible and inexpensive force that can be deployed when necessary (e.g. election periods);¹⁵ they provide local knowledge and representation, especially in cases where the state relies on indirect rule via local intermediaries in George Athor Militia of South Sudan; the Séléka militia in the Central African Republic; the Green Bombers in Zimbabwe; the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria; the Kibir Militia in Darfur). These varied examples attest to the larger role of militias in producing violence on demand for elites who do not want full responsibility and association in conflicts that may ‘benefit’ them (e.g. harassing voters or killing opponents) (see Raleigh, 2016). This abbreviated list demonstrates the commonality of PGM actions outside of war contexts, and the multiple domestic contexts (e.g. post-war, post-revolution, fragmented polity, or state repression) in which they operate.

¹³ These statistics come from the new PGM dataset created by the authors for this research. The dataset will be introduced and explored in more detail below, within the Data and Research Design section of the paper.

¹⁴ Despite these benefits and advantages, PGMs can also face drawbacks; namely, their informality implies that they are not necessarily suited to perform the tasks of traditional armed forces, and may suffer from a lack of professionalism (Ash, 2016). Konstantin Ash, “Threats to Leaders’ Political Survival and Pro-Government Militia Formation.” International Interactions (2016).

areas within its territory in which it has inconsistent control;\textsuperscript{16} and they are flexible in their use, formality, and instruction, and do not require formalization and associated responsibility.\textsuperscript{17} Early research suggesting that PGMs function as a ‘replacement’ force for weak and incapable state militaries\textsuperscript{18} fails to adequately address the proliferation and coordination of these agents. While this theory may explain the use of PGMs in states with less military capacity – such as DR-Congo or Somalia – it does not explain why states with strong and able militaries – such as Sudan or Zimbabwe – also use PGMs. It therefore remains unclear what the strategic benefits are for a regime to use PGMs in terms of violence management and longevity, given the availability of state armed forces.

The character of the modern developing and ‘democratizing’ state may go some way to explicating the use of multiple violence management strategies. The nature of developing and transitioning governance means that choosing one type of strategy (repression, counterbalancing, or PGM use) over another leaves regimes vulnerable. For example, a state that builds its military to effectively counter domestic and international threats allows for the possibility that a strong, cohesive military will be a threat to the regime.\textsuperscript{19} A regime that invests in supporting multiple, informal political militias at the detriment of formal forces will risk those forces allying to challenge the regime. But a complex calculus of threat balancing in the form of violence management within the state suggests that PGMs are crucial for periods and spaces of violent political elite competition both in and outside of ‘war’ scenarios, in addition to the common use of counterbalancing and repression. The spatial and temporal dynamics of PGMs, trends in their behavior, and fixtures in the security and political environments within developing states, are designed to fight ‘similar’ groups, including other militias and civilians. PGMs rarely interact with state forces that constitute ‘internal’ regime threats. The separate realms of violence management produce a cohesive strategy that allows most regimes to stay in power despite years of sustained threat.


\textsuperscript{17} See: Carey et al., 2012.


This research both contributes to and deviates from existing work on PGMs in several ways. It builds on the existing work by explaining why PGMs are employed, the circumstances under which they emerge and are deployed, and their functions in those environments. Interpreting PGM violence as an extension of internal government competition in patronage states is in line with recent research: Mazzei\textsuperscript{20} on Latin America, Ahram\textsuperscript{21} on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and Raleigh\textsuperscript{22} on Africa present political competition as a robust explanation for modern violence processes. Under scenarios of economic or political hardship – including significant declines in state income, or elections with multiple parties – the use of political militias should increase and be targeted at opposition members and supporters within and outside of the government. Regimes benefit in terms of extended tenure if they use multiple violence management strategies at their disposal.

By identifying a roster of PGMs through reported violent actions\textsuperscript{23} and extending the period of their use outside of civil wars, researchers can now fully account for their role within developing states. This new dataset provides widespread support for the ‘violence management’\textsuperscript{24} hypothesis that extends the delegation debate,\textsuperscript{25} and addresses the simultaneous presence and use of paramilitary, counterbalanced, and informal state forces.\textsuperscript{26}

**Pro-Government Militias**

Multiple assumptions have been made about PGMs: early research argued that they serve as supplements to formal government forces locally\textsuperscript{27} and perform a range of activities, such as sexual


\textsuperscript{22} Raleigh, 2016.

\textsuperscript{23} See Carey et al. (2013) for previous lists of PGM forces globally.


\textsuperscript{27} Carey et al., 2013
and gender based violence (SGBV) and genocide violence that the state did not want to be associated with.\textsuperscript{28} Using this framework, PGM emergence is associated with the security apparatus of ‘weak’ states as modern developing states face institutional limitations and constraints on how they can employ state forces and state rents. The ‘accountability’ argument suggests that PGMs conduct offenses that governments cannot or do not want to be deemed accountable for,\textsuperscript{29} or that states engage these forces to avoid high domestic or international scrutiny\textsuperscript{30} and salvage aid or neighboring relations. Recent work has both rejected and complicated the role of PGMs in carrying out this type of violence by positioning them within the wider context of developing government and violence strategies.\textsuperscript{31}

Using a unique dataset created on distinct conflict events perpetrated by PGMs, a different perspective emerges: PGMs often engage in attacks with opposition militias. In many states, they are active in the same space and time periods as state actors where they periodically operate as allies, but more often engage in violence which distinct and differentiated agents. Their activity is high in ‘war’ periods, but most active outside of those times, and increases substantially during elections. Relatedly, governments that are considered ‘transitioning’ to democracy employ more PGMs than those considered autocratic. They produce more fatalities per act than government troops or opposition militias.

In the PGM dataset of pro-government militias active in Africa between 1997 and 2014, three types of PGMs are identified, based on the strength of their relationship to the state and the patron of that relationship. All militias coded in the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project\textsuperscript{32,33} are first isolated and distinguished as ‘political’ or ‘communal’ (ethno-regional) groups.

\textsuperscript{30} Carey et al., 2015
\textsuperscript{33} Version 1 of the PGM-Set here relies on ACLED, Version 5.
Each PGM group is categorized in a context-specific role, whether locally (i.e. communal, co-ethnic relationship with regimes), politically (i.e. tie to a high-ranking politician, including the President), or a noted alliance to the military forces of the state. The individual groups are then investigated to determine whether they have a reported ‘pro-government affiliation’. A total of 247 unique African PGMs are identified in PGM-Set. These ‘pro-government affiliations’ consist of:

1. A political link to the regime or President.
2. An allied association with state forces.
3. A regional or ethnic tie to the regime or President.

Groups with a political link to the regime or President, and groups that have an allied association with state forces, are involved in a larger proportion of violence against civilians relative to involvement in other conflict activity (approximately 53% and 55% of their conflict activity, respectively – see Table 1). For example, in Sudan, the Janjaweed and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) (pre-2014) are PGMs categorized as having both of these affiliations, and are responsible for the majority of violence against civilians carried out by PGMs (over 84% of all instances of civilian targeting in Sudan). For groups with regional or ethnic ties to the regime or President, however, interactions with other armed agents comprise over 58% of their conflict activity, with approximately 41% of conflict activity made up by civilian targeting. For example, groups such as the Abala, Arab, Maaliya, Mundari, Murle, Rizaygat, and Salamat ethnic militias are together responsible for less than 7% of all civilian targeting carried out by PGMs in Sudan. Hence, there is a clear difference in which pro-government ties and relationships facilitate greater violence.

(Table 1 about here.).

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34 ACLED codes a range of activity, the details of which and how are available here: acleddata.com/methodology. In many cases across Africa, local source materials are incorporated. However, there is evidence that regimes use ‘unidentified’ armed groups to perpetrate violent activities against civilians. Acts involving the unidentified are not included in this analysis, both because we can not accurately associate these acts with a pro-government (rather than another affiliation), but also because coordination of violent activities for regimes and coordinated group action is the cornerstone of research on militias, rather than violence and risk more broadly.

35 Groups that have a stated link to the regime or President in media sources are categorized as having a pro-government affiliation in PGM-Set.

36 Militias that are reported to have allied with state forces at any point are specified as having pro-government affiliations in PGM-Set.

37 Ethnic militias sharing an ethnic affiliation with the President are coded as having pro-government ties in PGM-Set in line with notions that patronage politics so often lay along ethnic cleavages in Africa (for example, see: Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010). B. Eifert, E. Miguel, and D.N. Posner, “Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa.” American Journal of Political Science 54,2 (2010): 494-510.
In comparison to another PGM collection, between 1997 and 2007 the Carey et al. dataset of active PGMs identifies 99 unique groups active in Africa. While many of the identified PGMs overlap across the two datasets, there are differences in spatial coverage. For example, between PGM-Set and Carey et al. in Kenya during the overlapping years of 1997 to 2007, PGM-Set identifies seven unique PGMs to Carey et al.’s three groups, and approximately 14% of all organized, armed conflict involved the seven named groups within this cluster. These differences matter greatly in terms of what activity is captured, and which are ignored, and have implications for how we explain the motives and contexts of PGM use.

PGMs may function as both a supplement and a replacement for existing forces, acting as local self-defense units or Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), facilitating and consolidating regime territorial control, and leveraging their superior linguistic, topographical, and social skills for an influx of intelligence for regimes. Similarly, Jones finds that the state may ‘employ’ militias to “help pacify key areas of the country, especially rural areas where state control is minimal or non-existent,” especially when its own security forces are weak. Operating as local agents does not account for why PGMs are seen in spaces in which the state itself is co-active. Figure 1 maps the locations of all organized, armed conflict events in Africa between 1997 and 2014, specifying between PGMs and state conflict agents, suggesting that the state is largely active in all of the same areas as PGMs. Figure 2 maps the locations of all organized, armed conflict events in Africa between 1997 and 2014 involving PGMs relative to all other non-state actors. The comparison suggests again that non-state, non-PGM actors are active in all of the same areas as PGMs, suggesting that these groups are not necessarily used as replacement forces spatially.

38 Carey et al., 2013
39 Groups that exist in Carey et al.’s (2013) PGM dataset are crosschecked against conflict actors that are listed within the ACLED dataset; groups who share (similar) names and dates of conflict activity are included in PGM-Set as having a political link to the regime or President.
40 Ibid.
41 A number of these ten groups were active in late 2007 during President Kibaki’s election bid; however none of these groups are recorded by Carey et al. (2013).
42 Ibid.
43 These PGMs active in Kenya between 1997 and 2007 in PGM-Set are: the Kalenjin ethnic militia, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the Kikuyu ethnic militia, the Mungiki Militia, the Pokot ethnic militia, the Samburu ethnic militia, and the Turkana ethnic militia.
In states such as Sudan or Zimbabwe, militias operate alongside strong and able militaries, and often conduct similar activity. For states with less military capacity – including DR-Congo, Somalia, and Nigeria – PGMs supplement, rather than replace, state forces. These contexts are also characterized by multiple other groups, often working at the behest of specific ministries (e.g. Libya), politicians (e.g. Somalia), and local leaders with regime affiliations (e.g. DR-Congo). Indeed, even in the recent case of the Central African Republic – where the state military has all but collapsed and is responsible for fewer than 5% of all conflict activity in the past five years – at least two political militias have engaged in conflict, and both are believed to operate in association with political parties that have been official regimes at various points of the conflict.

The conclusions of these data are that the typical interpretations of PGM activity as a function of ‘weak states’ or ‘accountability’ explanations are insufficient to explain the variety of actions, locations, forms, and contexts.

**Delegation and Violence Management**

Regime violence ‘management’ emphasizes that informal, private armed groups are a necessary component of modern governance where political competition is lethal, positions on government hierarchies are determined by coercive potential and force, and the state is actually a collection of often competing interests and agendas. African regimes face a higher risk of internal over external threats; this internal risk is exacerbated in states with recent histories of one-party dominance and limited party or external competition. Since the avenues for competition through democratic elections are still often severely curtailed, competition becomes internal to parties, regimes, and governments. Effectively, political competition has been relocated to within internal governance structures. Acts central to elite competition on the local, regional and national levels are ‘contracted out’ to these groups. Therefore, PGMs are a consequence of governance structures and practices across developing states, and function as a critical component in upholding power structures.

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An alternative framing of governance, security, and violence agents suggests African regimes have logics and strategies for governance and ‘violence management’ that grow from elite negotiation. The objective is to employ violence to deal with threats, and by extension secure power and rents, and ensure regime longevity. PGMs play an increasingly larger role within violence management strategies due to the changing nature of threats to developing world regimes. Most African regimes do not have a monopoly on violence within their territory, but they may not actively seek it or require it for daily governance. A monopoly is expensive, difficult to build and enforce, and increases the support and strength of militaries, which can increase the risk of coups, and as a result, the state may be giving away its monopoly willingly. Given a lack of a monopoly and checkered capacity subnationally, governments can face multiple simultaneous threats: rebel forces targeting state power, militias using violence to negotiate the terms of inclusion, coup risk, riots and protests, and other non-state local actions. These multiple risks engage state forces and attention in different ways and in response, regimes engage in a wide variety of strategies to deal with violent and opposition threats, including repression, counterbalancing, and the creation and employment of extra-legal, informal forces – namely, PGMs. The most effective violence management strategy involves regimes engaging in multiple forms of response, simultaneously, where the outcome is continued regime power and suppressed opponents.

**Repression**

An increasing rate of civil security engagement, riots, and protests has stimulated renewed attention to repression by state forces. States may use repression as a tactic to enforce their hold on power and to reaffirm their authority. The use of repression tactics does help regimes to remain in power; and intimidating, targeting, and/or killing potential opposition is effective in quelling threats from

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48 Böhmelt and Clayton, 2015
51 Raleigh, 2016
52 Roessler, 2011
55 Escribá-Folch, 2013
organized groups. These tactics are common across many regimes. While repression may be seen more readily under autocratic regimes, there are differences in the level of repression seen within autocracies, and across democracies. African regimes often use repression to eradicate competition and subordinate civilian reform and revolt in order to ensure their survival. Repression activities generally can be carried out by formal and informal, non-state forces, in line with the transparency of the regime interests and strength of the opposition.

**Counterbalancing**

Concurrently, to mitigate or lessen the threat from the military or otherwise aligned internal forces, developing country regimes often decentralize security forces, thereby limiting the ability of the military to overwhelm the executive. This threat is persistent as many leaders “come from a military and security background themselves, and usually divide the armed forces into separate entities that must compete for resources and influence … they often command them personally or through trusted family members.” Counterbalancing results in multiple, overlapping agencies that are accountable to various members of the government, and become ‘their’ force: some examples include the presidential guard (often populated by soldiers from the home area of the President); intelligence forces with limited security structure ties (as seen in Pakistan, Kenya, and Zimbabwe); ‘anti-terrorist’ units; and the often poorly paid and coordinated army and police forces. The result, according to Hills, is that “African armies bear little resemblance to the Western organizational prototype, being more akin to armed camps owing clientalist allegiances to a few officers, tends to be overlooked, as does the strength of neopatrimonialism.” Further, she records in reference to a classic case in Nigeria:

Policing must be understood in relation to the activities of the military, some eight or more paramilitary units, various palace guards, numerous quasi-official units in various states and miscellaneous thugs associated with strongmen … [And] the creation of special units may also confuse relationships, with presidential guards, republican guards, general service units,

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56 Hafner-Burton et al., 2010
59 See: Clapham, 1996
paramilitary or intelligence units and informal networks of spies acting as counterweights to the regular forces. President Nkrumah, for instance, distrusted both the police and the army, who with their adherence to British traditions of professionalism and impartiality could not fulfill his security needs. Accordingly, he created a complex civilian-military security force, the National Security Service (NSS), which was directly responsible to him. He also deliberately encouraged police-military competition.  

Mehler confirms that unbalanced Special Forces and dominance of a few ethnic groups characterize African militaries. For example, in the Central African Republic, former President Kolingba created an armed force from his own minority group (Yakima), while other Presidents – notably President Patasse – increased the presidential guard relative to all other forces. Infighting amongst the security services continues in states in part because of the favored and polarizing conditions of some sectors over others, but also anarchical recruitment, an absence of basic training, barracks, and equipment.

Further, the politicization of defense and security forces and the use of non-conventional forces suggest, “the heteroclite composition of the security forces would lead to the absence of cohesion and discipline.”

The reasoning behind the multiplication of forces is that the fragmentation limits the ability of any political elite to challenge the regime with mutinous troops from one segment of the security forces. Stronger, better supplied, and allied forces would be able to counter and protect the established regime. Poorly coordinated and decentralized political forces are frequently found in states, including those with violent liberation histories (e.g. Zimbabwe) as well as those without (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan); in states with present or recent civil wars (e.g. DR-Congo); and in those without these specific forms of threat (e.g. Kenya). In contrast, those few African states which face a greater threat from outside rather than inside their borders are uniformly regarded as operating strong, centralized, and effective forces – such as those present in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Egypt. Counterbalancing does not protect leaders from all forms of instability: divisions in military and

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63 Hills, 2000, 6-7
65 Mehler, 2012
66 Mehler, 2012, 58
67 Barany (2011:26) notes that the likelihood of surviving popular rather than internal (i.e. coups) regime challenges is strongly related to security services that are centralized and “cooperate rather than distrust each other, and that are free
security forces reflect deep-seated fragmentation in their respective societies and elite power structures, and demonstrate that formal counterbalancing is insufficient to deal with most threats, even in ‘weak’ states. Why would regimes use PGMs in conjunction with formal, fragmented forces? Are these forces designed to ‘offset’ coup risks as substitutes for unreliable regular state forces, as argued by Carey et al., or does the presence of both counterbalanced forces and PGMs indicate that violence management strategies are differentiated to respond and manage distinct, separate threats?

By the ‘informal counterbalancing’ logic, PGMs should support regime security in the wider population and serve as a counter to formal forces, which are largely ‘unreliable’ in part because of formal counterbalancing. Outsourcing some security tasks offers efficiency gains (as force multipliers; providing specialized information; contributing to maintaining the legitimacy of the government) when governments anticipate a threat from rebel groups. In particular, “semi official militias are beneficial in situations where the government urgently needs a relatively low cost and flexible force, specialized information and legitimacy.” Figure 3 depicts states’ counterbalancing efforts and rates of PGM activity.

(Figure 3 about here.)

Militias can operate as counter-weights to coup forces, especially where large popular forces can protect regimes (e.g. the Chavez Bolivarian National Militia in Venezuela). More typically, paramilitary forces, rather than PGMs, are employed as a counterbalancing strategy as they aid in thwarting this threat and are established to conduct the same type of operations as formal state forces.

**Hypothesis 1:** If PGM activity is high, counterbalancing is curtailed.

**Informal forces (PGMs) and Violence Management**

from internal cleavages (over regime performance, for instance) … and should likewise be more steadfast in defending the established order. But in Yemen, former President Saleh relied on the “better equipped and trained Republican Guard, Central Security Forces and elite army units, whose loyalty he retained” (Barany, 2011:29).

68 Carey et al., 2015
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 9
71 De Bruin, 2015
73 Carey et al. 2015 include ‘paramilitaries’ and PGMs together as counter-coup forces.
Given the concurrent threats a state may face, the best strategy is for a leader to simultaneously implement both ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ strategies. Defensively, a leader should establish both counterbalancing paramilitary forces as well as PGMs at his/her disposal to guard against both internal and external threats. Offensively, a leader engaging in repression – intimidation, targeting, and killing of potential opposition – can minimize the rate of opposition they may experience, as this tactic can aid in a state’s reaffirmation of authority.

The ‘violence management’ perspective suggests that formal and informal forces serve different constituencies of state and elite power; what is ‘delegated’ to each is dependent on the pressures within a state, and from where such military pressures emanate. The role, support, and activity of PGMs are complex and dependent upon the political environments in which they are found. PGMs emerge to combat similar opposition organizations, or to engage with opposition supporters, while the military and police engage with other distinct, but similarly situated threats. They are present within contexts and periods of heightened state repression, modernization, the new world order, security privatization, greed, ethnicized grievance, state failure, and democratization. Regardless of the institutional character of the state (e.g. autocratic, semi-democratic, or otherwise),

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74 Hafner-Burton et al., 2010
75 Escribà-Folch, 2013
governments augment their capacity for coercion with groups who are a critical component of everyday governance; in such countries, this amounts to collaboration with non-state agents.

Violence management of diverse interests and agendas through a network of associated groups with whom the regime has stronger or weaker alliances suggests that militias are not exclusively – or even primarily – created to deal with state ‘crisis’, but rather perform a significant role in ‘banal’ governance. The nature of modern developing state threats requires a multifaceted management and response strategy. When responding to militia threats from opposing and competing political elites, it is more efficient to use PGMs as a response rather than employing more expensive paramilitaries or military forces if they are not necessary.

From a violence management framework, decentralization and democratization periods have increased both violent and non-violent threats to regimes and centralized power. The co-occurring and simultaneous actions of PGMs are a product of political fragmentation around party, regional, ethnic, or religious divisions during these changes. Political elites support and bolster their power by associating with an armed organization; this leads to a proliferation of groups designed to protect elites over providing internal or external communities. Hence, PGMs are an equal and separate component of purposefully decentralized and overlapping forces, and are used for a specific purpose therein. While there are multiple official agencies that – to a greater or lesser degree – can deal with threats to the state (e.g. rebel forces), PGMs are used by governing political elites to combat personal, local political and party competition. This would imply that a state leader uses PGMs when alternative political contenders compromise his/her personal power or position through specific circumstances that do not necessitate a state response. As other political contenders employ their own militias, so too do regimes cultivate these groups to counteract violent threats from political elites at different scales. This leads to the next hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 2:** PGM activity grows in line with the number of armed, active, named opposition groups against a regime.

The goal of any violence management strategy is the perpetuation of regime power. As evidence of successful offensive and defensive strategies, PGM violence should contribute to regime longevity,

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85 Ahram, 2014
and aid in securing a leader’s survival.\textsuperscript{86} A combination of counterbalancing, PGMs, and repression should be directed towards separate threats, and should in combination secure the position of leaders and regimes. This leads to the final hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 3A:** Regimes sustain longer terms by employing PGMs, over regimes that do not.

**Hypothesis 3B:** Of regimes using PGMs, those which counterbalance or increase their rate of repression in addition to increasing PGM activity sustain longer terms than those only employing PGMs.

**Data and Research Design**

The unit of observation for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 is country-year. The differences across states and within states over time can illustrate and test the conditions of emergence and PGM use by different regime types and leaders. Conflict data come from the ACLED project,\textsuperscript{87} from which armed, organized conflict events are extracted; this information is also used to create lagged variables accounting for organized, armed conflict events occurring within a state the prior year, as well as occurring within bordering African countries the prior year. Additionally, data surrounding the number of named, armed conflict actors taking up arms against the state are also extracted.\textsuperscript{88}

Counterbalancing data “incorporates information on both the number of rivaling military organizations and their respective strengths to capture the degree to which a state divides its military manpower into rivaling organizations.”\textsuperscript{89} This measure identifies all ground-combat compatible military organizations within each country,\textsuperscript{90} and includes both regular forces (e.g. regular and active army and marine corps troops), as well as paramilitary organizations. The index calculates the degree

\textsuperscript{86} Ash, 2016
\textsuperscript{87} Raleigh et al., 2010
\textsuperscript{88} Conflict variables are normalized for analysis.
\textsuperscript{90} This measure of counterbalancing differs from Belkin and Schofer’s (2003, 2005). It accounts only for ground-based forces, “as these are the only forces whose independent coercive capacities can be used to balance any military unit considering or trying to overthrow a regime” (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012:339). It does not include navies and air forces within counts of military and paramilitary organizations of a state, as these organizations were arguably not created “with the purpose of using their coercive capacities to balance military units aiming at overthrowing the regime” (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012:339). Only instances of marine units within navies and paratroopers within air forces are included. See Pilster and Böhmelt (2012) for further discussion of the calculation of this index. Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47,5 (2003):594–620; Belkin and Schofer, 2005; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012, 339.
to which a country engages in counterbalancing in a given year, as a result of the effective number of ground-combat compatible military organizations the country has.

Additional data are also included as controls. Annual state population is used as a proxy for state productivity; these data come from the World Development Indicators and are logged for analysis. An election year dummy (i.e. whether it is an election year within the state) is also included; these data come from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. Fixed effects linear models are employed here, this modeling form controls for omitted variables that differ between states yet are constant over time by using the change in the variables of interest over time to estimate their effects on the dependent variables.

The unit of observation for Hypotheses 3A and 3B is country-leader, as it explores the additional effect of PGMs, counterbalancing efforts, and repression on leader survival. Conflict data on state repression efforts (i.e. battles against armed opposition groups, and targeting of civilians) are from ACLED. Information surrounding the length of leader survival in tenure – specifically, the number of days spent in office – comes from the Archigos dataset. These data are used to determine the number of days as well as years a leader was in office.

Additional data are also included as controls here. Annual state population is included, and data come from the World Development Indicators and are logged for analysis. A dummy variable accounting for whether a state experienced civil war during a leader’s tenure is also included; this

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92 Population data is only available up to 2013; values for 2013 are used to fill missing values for 2014.
94 Raleigh et al., 2010
96 The five instances where a leader took office for a second, distinct time are treated as unique instances here in regard to country-leader observations. These instances include: Kabbah of Sierra Leone, Vieira of Guinea-Bissau, Sanha of Guinea-Bissau, Gnassingbé of Togo, and Abdel Aziz of Mauritania.
97 “World Development Indicators”
information comes from ACLED. Lastly, a measure of government effectiveness is also included; this information comes from the World Governance Indicators.

A conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression model is used for analysis of Hypothesis 3A; this model measures count frequency of the dependent variable (tenure in office, measured by number of days in office). Given that few leaders experience a high number of days in office, the dependent variable is overdispersed with a larger number of leaders experiencing fewer days in office.

A Heckman selection model is used to test Hypothesis 3B; this model allows for the evaluation of coupling increased PGM activity with other leadership survival strategies specifically in states which employ PGMs. The model includes 2-way interaction terms – to observe the joint effect of increasing PGM activity and counterbalancing or increasing the rate of state repression – as well as state fixed effects – to account for omitted variables that differ between states yet are constant over time. See Table 2 for an extensive description of the variables and data sources outlined above.

(Table 2 about here.)

Results

Results for the analysis are below. First, Hypothesis 1 is tested – whether PGM activity curtails counterbalancing efforts. Model 1 in Table 3 finds that the rate of armed conflict events in which PGMs are involved is statistically significantly and positively correlated with counterbalancing efforts. This goes against Hypothesis 1, suggesting that these organizations are specifically designed to deal with different scales of threat as one does not replace the other – and both increase in tandem, likely in response to heightened risk of threat to the regime. Table 4 provides examples of

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98 Raleigh et al., 2010
100 This measure “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2013). The range of this variable was altered to 0-5, changed from its original state of -2.5 to +2.5. The World Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2013) only offer governance data up to 2012, and are missing data for 1997, 1999, and 2001; missing values for 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2013 were filled in with country averages for analysis here.
states where counterbalancing rates may be high/low and the rate of PGM activity may be high/low, and vice-versa.

(Table 3 about here.)

(Table 4 about here.)

Hypothesis 2 asks whether opposition to the state affects the rate of PGM activity. Model 2 in Table 3 relays that the number of named, armed actors taking up arms against the state is positively correlated with the rate of armed conflict events in which PGMs are involved. This is in support of Hypothesis 2, pointing to the need for PGMs to fend off domestic threats against the regime.

The accountability theory argues that PGMs are kept distinct from state military forces, as opposed to being absorbed by the military, to distance state forces from responsibility for particularly brutal or shameful acts of violence (e.g. increasingly lethal civilian targeting). However, this does not account for why so many distinct PGMs exist within the same state, or why states may carry out brutal attacks in combination with PGM activity. Findings here suggest that PGMs may be kept separate from state forces because using multiple strategies of engaging PGMs, establishing counterbalancing strategies, and enforcing state repression strategies simultaneously result in the most 'effective' strategy for state leaders to ensure their survival and longevity in power.

Model 3 finds that regimes employing PGMs sustain longer terms. This is in support of Hypothesis 3A. These results are presented in Table 5.

(Table 5 about here.)

Model 4 tests Hypothesis 3B to determine if, of regimes using PGMs, those which counterbalance or increase their rate of repression in addition to increasing PGM activity sustain longer terms than those only employing PGMs. The two-step Heckman selection model testing this hypothesis is presented in Table 6.

(Table 6 about here.)

The second stage of the model (top half of Table 6) finds that of regimes that employ PGMs, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between regimes that increase the rate of PGM activity while also counterbalancing (2-way interaction term), and the number of days a leader
remains in office. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, for example, assumed office in December 1987, and remains there today. While in power (specifically during the time period of 1997 to 2014), over 61% of armed conflict in Zimbabwe has been attributable to PGM activity – one of the highest rates reported in Africa – and counterbalancing has been in effect (in fact, the average counterbalancing index for Zimbabwe was 2.12, one of the highest on the continent).

Additionally, of regimes that employ PGMs, there is also a statistically significant and positive relationship between regimes that increase the rate of PGM activity while also increasing their rate of repression (2-way interaction term), and the number of days a leader remains in office. For example, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan assumed office in June 1989, and remains there today. While in power (specifically during the time period of 1997 to 2014), over 16% of armed conflict in Sudan has been attributable to PGM activity – or 964 conflict events – while approximately 35% of armed conflict in Sudan has been attributable to state repression tactics – or 2,051 conflict events.

Of regimes that employ PGMs, those that solely see a high rate of PGM activity do not increase their rate of survival – likely a result of not guarding against the multitude of other threats that leaders may face. Examples include Laurent Kabila of DR-Congo, who in 1996 assumed control of the state with a very limited military presence due to the actions of Mobutu Seke Seko; using PGMs – in part made up from the AFDL group that brought him to power – he engaged in a civil war with insufficient forces to keep him in power; the current leader of DR-Congo is his son Joseph Kabila, who has engaged in significant co-option and repression of armed groups and civilians, alliances with foreign militaries, and other tactics to retain power. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 3B.

**Discussion and Concluding Remarks**

Militias are violent organizations designed to perpetuate conflict to influence the distribution of power and pursue the agendas of political elites. PGMs are a subsection of this larger community of violent agents who engage in conflict, often against civilians, to protect or strengthen the power of the regime in developing states. PGMs represent informal conflicts that mirror the formal security structure and problems in states. PGM presence is based on the threat type and level that governments experience from domestic competition, including that internal to the government.
Militias generally, and PGMs specifically, have increased in number and action in recent years across developing states. Many African and developing states have political environments that can be aptly characterized as ‘oligopolies’ of violence, instead of monopolies. They have become the primary agents of political violence for several reasons: they are a flexible, ‘cheap’ forces that allow political elites and regimes to distance themselves from the violence they perpetuate both in and outside of ‘formal’ conflict periods; they have arisen in conjunction with the rise of ‘inclusive’ political elite competition; and they allow governments to perpetuate intense and fatal violence without direct attribution or sanction but in keeping with networks of alliance and power. PGM violence as an extension of competition internal to governance processes in patronage states is in line with Mazzei\textsuperscript{102} on Latin America, Ahram\textsuperscript{103} on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and Raleigh\textsuperscript{104} on Africa.

In addition to the domestic threats that regimes face as a result of political elites and inclusive politics, African leaders still face a high internal risk of coups, purges, putsches, and mutinies\textsuperscript{105} and increasingly a vocal public who engage in public protest. In response to these myriad threats, and to assure the continuation of the regime despite instability from several areas and scales, developing states engage in ‘violence management’ both in overtly conflictual and non-conflict periods. Violence management involves three strategies: (1) repression by state forces of public protests and civilians; (2) counterbalancing strategies through the fragmentation of military and police organizations and the establishment of specialized paramilitary forces – these auxiliary state forces operate as supplements to particular branches and elites in governments, as the internal fractures within developing countries’ institutional structures is often significant and exerts a far greater threat to the stability of the state than external threats; and (3) the creation, use, and support for multiple PGMs across the state. Multiple PGMs are often found within states corresponding to the threat they are designed to contain. Regime parties, local ethno-regional affiliates, and allied political authorities can each establish PGMs across the state to address and mitigate threats. These combined strategies work to ‘manage’ violence and, in combination, are associated with violence ‘benefitting’ the state and prolong office tenure.

\textsuperscript{102} Mazzei, 2009
\textsuperscript{103} Ahram, 2011a, 2011b, 2014
\textsuperscript{104} Raleigh, 2016
\textsuperscript{105} Roessler, 2011
In contrast to explanations of political violence that suggest conflict emerges from crisis, and the presence of conflict is indicative of state weakness, the violence management framework and the use of PGMs illustrate how strong states experience a myriad of threats, but are able to employ violence within their territory to effectively mitigate instability. PGMs are therefore a critical component of strong state power, as they indicate how threats to regimes emerge from local competition, party competition, and national political agendas.
Table 1. PGM Conflict Involvement by Type of PGM, Africa, 1997-2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of PGM</th>
<th>Battles</th>
<th>Remote Violence</th>
<th>Violence against Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PGMs having an allied association with state forces</td>
<td>46.10%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td>52.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGMs with a political link to the regime or President</td>
<td>43.70%</td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>55.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGMs with regional or ethnic ties to the regime or President</td>
<td>58.10%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>41.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Mean (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PGM Conflict Events</strong></td>
<td>Number of organized, armed conflict events involving PGMs that occurred in a given state in a given year (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>2.11 (1.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Actors Against State</strong></td>
<td>Number of distinct, named, armed actors against the state in a given year (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.92 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterbalancing</strong></td>
<td>Index capturing the degree to which a state engages in counterbalancing in a given year; based on the number of rivaling military organizations and their respective strengths</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>1.63 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader Survival (Days)</strong></td>
<td>A measure of leadership survival and tenure captured by the number of days a leader remains in office</td>
<td>1961-2014</td>
<td>3165.66 (3730.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PGM Presence</strong></td>
<td>Dummy variable capturing whether PGM conflict activity occurred during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.77 (0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterbalancing (country-year)</strong></td>
<td>Dummy variable capturing whether counterbalancing was used during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.75 (0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of PGM Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Proportion of all organized, armed conflict events involving PGMs occurring during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.12 (0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proportion of State Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Proportion of all organized, armed conflict events involving state forces occurring during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.40 (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (country-year)</strong></td>
<td>Total population of a state in a given year (in thousands of people) (normalized)</td>
<td>1960-2013</td>
<td>16.05 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (country-leader)</strong></td>
<td>Average total population of a state during the tenure of a leader (in thousands of people) (normalized)</td>
<td>1960-2013</td>
<td>16.00 (1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election Year</strong></td>
<td>Dummy variable capturing an election year in a given state</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.14 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Conflict Events</strong></td>
<td>Number of organized, armed conflict events that occurred in a given state in a given year (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>2.70 (1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armed Conflict Events</strong></td>
<td>Number of organized, armed conflict events that occurred during the tenure of a leader (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>5.12 (1.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Armed Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Number of organized, armed conflict events that occurred in a given state in the previous year (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>2.65 (1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior Bordering Conflict</strong></td>
<td>Spatial lag variable capturing number of organized, armed conflict events that occurred in bordering states in the previous year (normalized)</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>4.99 (1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil War</strong></td>
<td>Dummy variable capturing a civil war during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1997-2014</td>
<td>0.36 (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Effectiveness Index</strong></td>
<td>Index capturing average &quot;perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies&quot; during the tenure of a leader</td>
<td>1998, 2002-2012</td>
<td>1.92 (0.56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Counterbalancing Indicator</th>
<th>(2) Armed Conflict Involving PGMs (ln)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events Involving PGMs (ln)</td>
<td>0.0223* (0.0125)</td>
<td>0.219* (0.132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Actors Against the State (ln)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0319** (0.0150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events (ln)</td>
<td>-0.0319** (0.0150)</td>
<td>0.612*** (0.0938)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbalancing Indicator</td>
<td>0.184* (0.0974)</td>
<td>-0.0178 (0.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.184* (0.0974)</td>
<td>-0.0178 (0.577)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events in Prior Year (ln)</td>
<td>0.00434 (0.0130)</td>
<td>-0.00615 (0.0824)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events in Prior Year in Bordering States (ln)</td>
<td>-0.00216 (0.0158)</td>
<td>-0.115 (0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year (dummy)</td>
<td>-0.0248 (0.0315)</td>
<td>0.392** (0.185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.389 (1.639)</td>
<td>-0.544 (9.672)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of States</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. PGM Presence and Counterbalancing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Counterbalancing</th>
<th>High Counterbalancing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low PGM Presence</td>
<td>• Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>• Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Swaziland</td>
<td>• Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High PGM Presence</td>
<td>• DR-Congo</td>
<td>• Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Libya</td>
<td>• Ivory Coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Results for Hypothesis 3A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Days in Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM Presence (dummy)</td>
<td>1.000**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-3.439***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.819)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War (dummy)</td>
<td>0.746**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>2.514***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>60.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6. Results for Hypothesis 3B.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: Number of Days in Office</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Armed Conflict Events Involving PGMs (ln)</td>
<td>-19.066***</td>
<td>(7.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterbalancing (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.260</td>
<td>(1.604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Armed Conflict Events Involving State Repression (ln)</td>
<td>-724.2</td>
<td>(2.737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION: Proportion of Armed Conflict Events Involving PGMs (ln) * Counterbalancing (dummy)</td>
<td>12.306*</td>
<td>(6.726)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION: Proportion of Armed Conflict Events Involving PGMs (ln) * Proportion of Armed Conflict Events Involving State Repression (ln)</td>
<td>17.488**</td>
<td>(8.507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events (ln)</td>
<td>1.430***</td>
<td>(318.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>-12.631***</td>
<td>(1.604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War (dummy)</td>
<td>-79.22</td>
<td>(891.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Effectiveness</td>
<td>12.893***</td>
<td>(1.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>190.247***</td>
<td>(25.843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV: PGM Presence (dummy)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Armed Conflict Events (ln)</td>
<td>0.671***</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (ln)</td>
<td>0.482***</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War (dummy)</td>
<td>-1.941***</td>
<td>(0.550)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.328***</td>
<td>(2.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho Selection Effect</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>(0.630)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>132</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1. Organized Armed Conflict Involving Pro-Government Militias and State Conflict Actors, Africa, 1997-2014.
Figure 2. Organized Armed Conflict Involving Pro-Government Militias and Other Non-State Conflict Actors, Africa, 1997-2014.
Figure 3. PGM Presence versus Counterbalancing