

**Hired Guns:
The Conflict Patterns and
Role of Pro-Government Militias**

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Abstract: Pro-government militias (PGMs) are informal violent organizations designed to perpetuate conflict for purposes that conform to regime agendas. Much of this literature contends that the emergence and use of PGMs is primarily a function of (1) capacity, to carry out violence in the spaces where the state does not have the ability to do so, and (2) accountability, to conduct offenses that governments cannot / do not want to be deemed accountable for. Introducing a newly-created dataset on PGMs and their conflict activity, we support an alternative theory: PGM emergence and activities are crucial structures in governance practices across developing states, as they function to uphold power structures where internal competition amongst regime elites and politicians defines most conflict environments. The rise of informal violence agents that operate to further regime coercion is directly related to the coordination and factionalization of formal forces. The fragmentation and competition between security services is itself a function of the higher risks of internal rather than external threats. PGMs are a necessary component of modern governance where political competition is lethal, positions on government hierarchies are determined by coercive potential and force, and the state is actually a collection of often competing interests and agendas.

Pro-government militias (hereafter PGMs) are a growing risk to the safety of civilians and stability of developing states. Distinctions and definitions are crucial to the discussion of violent agents: militias, mercenaries, paramilitaries, local defense forces, and gangs are categories designed to describe organizations that are informal, violent, and operating with a political agenda. The various terms situate groups relative to each other, the state and other violent actors. However, these categories often assume – rather than confirm – how and why these groups arise, who they ‘work for’, where and who is targeted, and their motives. For example, much of the recent research on all militias assumes their pro-government relationship: Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell (2015), Mitchell, Carey, and Butler (2014), and Cohen and Nordås (2015) present evidence that suggest only the state contracts out violence to these extra-state organizations. Other research concentrates on militias’ actions solely within civil wars (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 2015a), where they operate as supplemental local forces for both government and rebel groups. Yet non-war scenarios, including elections or periods of intense political competition in unstable societies – such as Kenya, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and Nigeria – experience most violence from militias. Further, the universe of agents that function as armed groups for opposition political parties (e.g. the Amal movement in Lebanon from the 1970s; the Anti-Balaka during the Djotodia presidency and after in Central African Republic; the Badr organization in Iraq; the Mombasa Revolutionary Council in Kenya; the Unified Democratic Patriots Party in Tunisia), communities (e.g. the Turkana militia in Kenya; the Mayi-Mayi in DR-Congo), political elites (e.g. the Yau Yau militia of South Sudan), politicians (e.g. the George Athor Militia of South Sudan; the Séléka militia in Central African Republic; the Green Bombers in Zimbabwe; the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria; the Kibir Militia in Darfur), and so forth attest to their larger role in producing violence on demand for elites who do not want full responsibility and association in conflict that may ‘benefit’ them (e.g. harassing voters or killing opponents) (see Raleigh, 2014a).

How and where should we situate militias within larger frameworks of political violence and its emerging contexts? Several research traditions have located the rise of informal armed agents within contexts and periods of heightened state and repression (Carey and Mitchell, 2011), modernization (Chabal 2005; Forrest 2006; Bates 2008), the new world order (Kaldor, 2001; Williams, 2008), security privatization (Ero, 2000; Bates, 2008), greed (Kaplan 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Goldstone 2002; Urdal 2005), ethnicized grievance (King, 2001; Guichaoua, 2010), state failure (Reno 2007; Bates 2008), and democratization (Mueller 2008; Raleigh, 2014a). Many consider the changing international political economy – underlying the new world order and emphasizing capital flight, the shift from public to private goods, and ultimately greed – as creating *de facto* ‘warlords’ who plunder developing states without challenge from severely weakened and impoverished state systems. Of course, politicians and regimes are considered as, if not more, likely to be these ‘warlords’ and use militias (see Raleigh, 2014a). Yet, militias appear in states with robust, growing economies (e.g. Nigeria), states without significant valuable resource exports (e.g. Kenya), and where security is not privatized.

While dire economic fortunes face many, if not most, developing states, simultaneous and often independent political shifts occur which upset the centralized control once associated with developing, and particularly African, states. In a post-Cold War era, governments were forced to decentralize and democratize. That process has been difficult and bloody in many cases, and subject to regression (e.g. in Uganda), reversal (e.g. in Zimbabwe) and repression in others (e.g. in Burundi). Nonetheless, the power of the central authority has waned across Africa, and is now subject to both internal (i.e. regime and party) and external competition from challengers. As a result of intense competition for state roles, to hold power in Africa – and many developing states – is to be the best

‘provider’ of benefits to powerful, allied subnational elites. This system of alliance exchange is aptly described as a ‘marketplace of loyalties’ (see De Waal, 2009). From this reading, the political fortunes of the state are a function of relationships between political and economic elites. Political militias operating for the state may be a crucial security and offensive component for this system of high-level competition and fragmentation.

Of all active militias operating on behalf of political elites (e.g. rebel leaders, politicians, political parties, warlords, military, government officials, etc.), those associated with the state have the most pervasive and negative impact on civilians; PGMs are more actively involved in violence against civilians than other militias – over 10% more PGM conflict activity is comprised of violence against civilians relative to non-PGM militias – and their involvement in these events is more lethal relative to other militias; each instance of civilian targeting by a PGM leads on average to three times more civilian deaths than those carried out by other militias). For that reason, this article addresses the role and actions of militias with pro-government affiliations and their dynamics across developing states, both in relation to the state and to other violent groups.

Existing interpretations of PGM actions largely depend on ‘delegation’ theory where these groups both supplement and replace the state. By supplementing, particular acts or targets of political violence are ‘contracted out’ to these groups. In a replacement scenario, their rise represents evidence of a fragile or failed state with little control over its territory. In the latter cases, regimes become dependent on weak alliances with warlords and the like to retain a weak grip on power. In line with delegation theory, if state power determines the presence and role of PGMs, then weak states should use PGMs often and instead of active military forces (i.e. replacement scenario), while strong states should have no need for these groups, or ought to only designate particular shameful activities to them, such as violence against civilians or sexual violence (i.e. supplement scenario).

An alternative interpretation of PGMs suggests that (1) they are crucial for state management where political competition is often violent; (2) their roles are associated with political competition between elites within and outside of government; and (3) under scenarios of economic or political hardship – including significant declines in state income, or elections with multiple parties – the use of political militias should increase and be targeted at opposition members and supporters within and outside of the government. This reading of PGM violence as an extension of competition internal to governance processes in patronage states is in line with Mazzei (2009) on Latin America, Ahram (2011a, 2011b, 2014) on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and Raleigh (2014a) on Africa.

From this lens, PGMs are necessary for states to ‘augment’ their capacity for coercion from the local to national levels. PGMs have their own local agendas, and can navigate between the needs of regimes at different time points, and their own local struggles in determining who to target, where to operate and how to assault (Gerlach, 2010; Ahram, 2014). The agency ascribed to PGMs through their role in conflict and violence management better suits the histories of different groups, their endurance in non-crisis periods, and why multiple groups may operate simultaneously within states. Hence, PGMs do not arise in response to the nature or size of a specific crisis, the need for states to defer responsibility, or solely to act as the state where it is absent. Rather, they are built on the everyday governance that is dependent on collusion between state and non-state actors.

Considering the spatial and temporal dynamics of PGMs, the trends in their behavior, and their roles as fixtures in the security and political environments within developing states, we find that PGM actions are strongly associated with distinct branches or personnel of the state for which they

operate. PGMs are designed to fight ‘similar’ groups including other militias and civilians. This attests to their role in violence ‘management’ wherein regimes ‘manage’ competition with other political elites through respective militias.

This research deviates from existing work on PGMs in several ways: it identifies a roster of PGMs through reported violent actions; it considers the exact ways in which actions by PGMs differ from both the state’s and other politically violent agents’ by comparing activities and events, not simply affiliations; and it provides widespread support for the ‘violence management’ hypothesis and counters explanations focused on delegation and failed statehood.

The paper proceeds as follows: first, we review existing literature, exploring the types and actions of PGM activity within preliminary observations to examine the common (mis)perceptions about PGM conflict activity; we track the activity of these groups across countries over time, and in line with other violent agents within states. Our study is presently concentrated on African states, as available data allowed for the specific association of multiple groups to politicians within states. We identify three types of PGMs based on the strength of their relationship to the state, and the patron of that relationship; each group operates in line with what is broadly understood as a context-specific role, whether locally (i.e. communal, co-ethnic relationship with regimes), politically (i.e. tie to a high-ranking politician, including the President), or a noted alliance to the military forces of the state. These each represent pro-government ties, but differ in what we expect their supplemental role should be. Using these newly-coded data, we test the delegation and failed statehood arguments, as well as our ‘violence management’ hypothesis, lastly discussing results and concluding.

Pro-Government Militias

Within that large and growing universe of political violence agents, we consider pro-government groups to be a large and diverse community, and best defined by Mazzei (2009, p. 4-5):

Paramilitary groups are political, armed organizations that are by definition extra military, extra-State, noninstitutional entities, but which mobilize and operate with the assistance of important allies, including factions within the State. Thus while officially illegal, [paramilitary groups] enjoy some of the resources, access, and status generally exclusive to the State but which is funneled off by political and military allies. This paradox is central to the nature of the paramilitary group. Paramilitaries are offensive, not defensive in nature; their very purpose is to eliminate those who are perceived as threatening the socioeconomic basis of the political hierarchy.

This definition offers a more substantive interpretation of these groups that transcends the somewhat reductive roles as ‘protector’ or ‘predator’, and locates these groups within the structures of the state, regime, and associated branches (e.g. military and police). Mazzei (2009), in writing on the expansive Latin American militia experience, further argues that (1) militias emerge from a combination of motives by regime, ministries, and state offices to curtail civilian challenges and nascent opposition, (2) they are supplied and trained by military and police branches who cannot or will not directly purge civil society members, and (3) they are supported and financed by business elites who require the state to protect interests.

Yet the function of militias remains stubbornly difficult to condense and clarify. Arguably this is more important than their allegiance and affiliation, which can be purchased, or motivated to

change, in and for different circumstances. How strongly we associate these groups with the ‘state’ or individuals and organizations that may temporarily rule has important implications for what their role is within the larger political and conflict environment operating in developing states, the nature of competitive politics therein, and when and where they pose a risk.

PGMs comprise approximately 9% of all organized, armed conflict activity – and specifically, 30% of all organized, armed *militia* conflict activity – in African states between 1997 and 2014; these groups are responsible for over 5% of all conflict-related fatalities during that same period. These groups are active both during and outside of civil war periods. Approximately 7% of all organized, armed conflict during civil war periods – and specifically, approximately 26% of all organized, armed *militia* conflict activity during this period – is attributed to PGMs; these groups are responsible for over 5% of all conflict-related fatalities during that same period. By contrast, outside of civil war periods, 2% of all organized, armed conflict – and specifically, approximately 57% of organized, armed *militia* conflict activity – is attributable to PGMs; these groups are responsible for 8.5% of all conflict-related fatalities during that same period. This suggests that though these groups make up a larger proportion of conflict events during civil war periods, they are still especially active outside of these temporal periods, suggesting that these groups are not necessarily used only as replacement forces temporally during civil war periods.

From a review of politically violent agents operating in Africa from 1997 to 2014, 237 distinct PGMs are identified by year, state, and location. Of these, 110 have an allied association with a state force in one or more reported conflict events, 138 have a political link to the regime or the President specifically, and 25 are from the same region or ethnic group as the regime.¹ As PGMs can have ties to the government in more ways than one, certain groups can be classified as having multiple pro-government connections (e.g. ZANU-PF has both a political link to the regime and President, as well as an allied association with state forces in reported conflict events; the Dinka ethnic militia in South Sudan shares an ethnic affiliation with the regime, and has also been linked politically to the regime and President). This tally of PGMs differs from those reported by others: for the same time period and region, Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe (2013) report 89 PGMs, or 37% of the total identified here.²

Rise and Function of PGMs

Why do states with active military forces create and support militias? Delegation is central to many explanations of PGMs wherein militaries and states delegate some or most of their activities to these more informal allied forces for two reasons: (1) a government lacks the capacity for violence in a specific area or larger spaces and hence uses these groups in those specific areas, and/or (2) governments do not want to be accountable for the activities that are undertaken by militias, and hence using these groups allows them plausible deniability.

¹ This is explored in further detail in the Methodology section. In line with our contention about civil war and other periods of contestation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project provides conflict data, coding

² From Carey et al.’s (2013) report, 332 Pro-Government Militias are identified from 1981 to 2007 across all countries. 143 are in Africa, with 89 of that total operational between 1997 and 2007 (the period of direct overlap with the data presented here).

Capacity

The capacity argument suggests that PGMs arise in order to carry out violence in the spaces the state does not have the capacity to do so itself. The capacity theory varies from assuming the lack of a central state has facilitated the rise of ‘warlords’ affiliated with the state and other political elites (see Reno, 1998; Kaldor, 2001) to more subtle relationships arising in selective areas of states with limited oversight (see Herbst, 2000).

Outside of rare cases of central state failure, more evidence suggests PGMs facilitate action and information for specific purposes: Peic (2014) argues that a subset of PGMs are local self-defense units or Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs) used during insurgent conflicts as PGMs can facilitate an ‘influx of intelligence for regimes’ in two ways: “(1) by consolidating incumbent territorial control and in doing so, encouraging civilian denunciations; [and] (2) by leveraging their superior linguistic, topographical and social skills so as to gather information from fellow citizens more effectively” (p.163). Depending on the strength of the state in local areas, these groups may function as both a supplement and a replacement. Nonetheless, Peic (2014) claims that a state is 53% more likely to effectively deal with a ‘guerrilla’ threat if CDFs are in place. Yet, the presence of CDFs suggests that the state has effective leverage over the actions of local elites – such as those ordered to create CDFs – and therefore these pre-existing state networks in rural areas may be to the advantage of the state. CDFs are a manifestation of local cooperation that can take multiple forms, including communal militias that, in addition to contesting local power structures, can cooperate with governments when necessary for both sides. Similarly, Jones (2012) finds that the state may ‘employ’ militias to “help pacify key areas of the country, especially rural areas where state control is minimal or non-existent”, especially when its own security forces are weak (p.3).


Local knowledge and local representation are critical to states which may have inconsistent control over their territory and rely on a form of indirect rule via local intermediaries in both conflict and non-conflict periods (Mann, 2004; Gerlach, 2010; Ahram, 2014). Intermediary or indirect rule is a frequent practice of almost all African states, and regimes vary in the extent to which they employ strategies of incorporating political elites into their control strategy. In these cases PGMs operate as replacement forces where the state is not active, and are tasked with carrying out violence on behalf of the state. Therefore, the comparative patterns of activity between state and PGM forces ought to be similar, but conducted in different spaces and locations. While Peic (2014) and Jones (2012) find supporting results for their theories within their case studies of Afghanistan, Peru, Colombia, Greece, Guatemala, Vietnam, Iraq, and Turkey, the broad application of the capacity theory does not account for why PGMs are seen in spaces in which the state itself is co-active (see Figure 1).

For states such as Sudan or Zimbabwe, militias operate alongside strong and able militaries, often conducting similar activity. For states with less military capacity – including DR-Congo, Somalia, and Nigeria – PGMs supplement, rather than replace, state forces. In particular, they may emerge to combat similar opposition organizations or engage with opposition supporters while the military and police engage with other distinct, but similarly situated threats.

State forces in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe are engaged in approximately a quarter of the political violence activity between 1997 and 2014. However, these same contexts are also characterized by multiple other groups, often working at the behest of specific ministries (e.g. Libya), politicians (e.g. Somalia), and local leaders with regime affiliations (e.g. DR-Congo). Indeed, even in the recent case of Central African Republic – where the state military has all but collapsed and is


responsible for fewer than 5% of all conflict activity in the past five years – two political militias have engaged in conflict, and both are believed to operate in association with political parties that have been official regimes at various points of the conflict. In short, the role, support, and activity of PGMs are complex and dependent upon the political environments in which they are found.

Figure 1. Organized Armed Conflict Involving Pro-Government Militias and State Conflict Actors, Africa, 1997-2014.



Relative to other conflict actors, PGMs do not necessarily operate in unique spatial areas. Figure 1 maps the locations of all organized, armed conflict events in Africa between 1997 and 2014, specifying between PGMs and state conflict agents, suggesting that the state is largely active in all of the same areas as PGMs. Figure 2 maps the locations of all organized, armed conflict events in Africa between 1997 and 2014 involving PGMs relative to all other non-state actors. The comparison suggests again that non-state, non-PGM actors are active in all of the same areas as PGMs, suggesting that these groups are not necessarily used as replacement forces spatially.

Figure 2. Organized Armed Conflict Involving Pro-Government Militias and Other Non-State Conflict Actors, Africa, 1997-2014.



Are PGMs specifically used in particular cases, and is this due to decreased capacity? To explore this, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1: In periods and locations where state forces exhibit low military performance and presence, a higher degree of conflict activity involves PGMs.

Accountability

The accountability argument suggests that PGMs conduct offenses that governments cannot or do not want to be deemed accountable for (see: Ron, 2002; Alvarez, 2006; Staniland, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2014; Carey et al., 2015). States may choose to do this to avoid high domestic or international scrutiny (Carey et al., 2015) that may affect international standing, stability, aid, or neighboring relations.

The implications for this argument are that PGM activity profiles differ from state forces in observable and crucial ways including engaging with civilian targets, activities with high fatality counts, sexual political violence, urban campaigns, etc. By definition, those conducting these offenses are disreputable, and allies are tarnished. Further, while actions by militias and state forces can occur concurrently and within the same spaces, PGMs should be primarily or exclusively involved in violence that the state is not partaking in, such as civilian targeting or sexual violence. Table 1 shows that a larger proportion of the conflict activity of PGMs is made up of civilian targeting – almost half of their conflict activity – relative to other conflict actors, though they are not the only conflict actors that carry out this type of violence.

Table 1. Proportional Distribution of Violence by Conflict Actor and Event Type, Africa, 1997-2014.

Conflict Agents	Interaction with Other Armed Agents	Violence against Civilians
State Forces	84.14%	15.86%
Rebels	75.69%	24.31%
PGMs	50.71%	49.28%
Non-PGM Militias	61.93%	38.06%

However, Table 2 shows that the most lethal instances of violence against civilians are not carried out by PGMs.³ In fact, on average, instances in which the state has targeted civilians have been deadlier than instances in which PGMs have carried out this violence, suggesting that the state does not in fact delegate high intensity activity to PGMs in order to absolve itself. Further, the conflict activity of PGMs initially appears largely similar to that of state forces in the same geographical areas and time periods (see Figure 1), suggesting that they are not carrying out violence in distinct time periods or spaces in order to not involve the state.

Table 2. Conflict Actors' Involvement in Violence Against Civilians, Africa, 1997-2014.

	State Forces	Rebels	PGM	Non-PGM Militias	External Forces
Proportion of violence against civilians	25.17%	30.04%	28.78%	13.63%	2.38%
Range of fatalities	0 to 600	0 to 25,000	0 to 1,000	0 to 350	0 to 1,369
Ratio of fatalities to event	3.83	12.23	3.31	1.20	24.76

Accounting for the various pro-government ties that these groups may have, groups with a political link to the regime or President and groups that have an allied association with state forces, are involved in a larger proportion of violence against civilians relative to involvement in other conflict activity (approximately 53% and 55% of their conflict activity, respectively). For groups with regional or ethnic ties to the regime or President, however, interactions with other armed agents

³ The data here do not include the conflict activity of unidentified armed groups (UAGs), who are responsible for over 27% of all violence against civilians in Africa during this time period. These groups can and do operate on behalf of state forces in certain settings (for example, in Sudan); however, they work against the state during other settings, such as when they have allied with a rebel group or non-PGM militia (for example, in Somalia where much conflict activity attributed to UAGs is in association with Al Shabaab) (ACLED, 2012).

comprise over 58% of their conflict activity, with approximately 41% of conflict activity made up by civilian targeting. There is hence a difference in which pro-government ties and relationships facilitate greater violence. For example, in Sudan, the Janjaweed and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are PGMs categorized as having both an allied association with state forces as well as a political link to the regime or President, and are responsible for the majority of violence against civilians carried out by PGMs (over 84% of all instances of civilian targeting). Meanwhile, groups such as the Abala, Arab, Maaliya, Mundari, Murle, Rizaygat, and Salamat ethnic militias – groups with regional or ethnic ties to the regime or President – are together responsible for less than 7% of all civilian targeting carried out by PGMs.

In addition to the evidence against the ‘accountability’ theory provided here, Stanton (2015) finds civilian targeting by PGMs to have similar patterns as state violence; this co-variation suggests that this PGM activity is not replacing state activity of the same nature. States have a range of options to hide affiliation – including co-opting or paying groups without a direct connection, or using ‘unidentified’ armed groups to perpetrate abuses. Cohen and Nordås (2015) also do not find evidence to suggest PGM violence is a cover for intentional sexual violence by the state. They argue that despite the level of disrepute that may be associated with sexual violence, “states commit sexual violence as a complement to — rather than a substitute for — violence perpetrated by militias” (p.878).

Our second hypotheses are therefore a test of the accountability theory through a comparison on conflict event targeting, intensity, and frequency.

Hypothesis 2a: Compared to state forces within the same time period and location, more conflict events involving PGMs target civilians.

Hypothesis 2b: Compared to state forces within the same time period and location, conflict events involving PGMs are more deadly than those involving state forces.

Observed patterns of activity across African states suggest that the aforementioned dichotomy of delegation theory – that PGMs are used either as replacement or supplementary forces – does not adequately explain the creation, function, and actions of PGMs. Strong states may use militias to complement their already active militaries, and in similar ways. For example, while the Sudanese state was actively engaged in violence against civilians throughout its territory, so too were the multiple PGMs operating on its behalf – and often in the same regions. If PGMs and state forces in these countries are active in similar areas, time periods, and against similar groups, this indicates that no ‘special’ activity is designated to them. Furthermore, multiple PGMs exist in these contexts (for example, in Sudan, the Janjaweed and the Rapid Support Forces, amongst others), yet existing explanations can account for neither why multiple groups exist nor for their activity against other violent organizations, civilians, and each other.

In short, why use PGMs if not to perform extreme and illegal acts, or to operate in places in which the state has limited access?

Governance and Institutions

An alternative interpretation suggests that PGMs are a consequence of the structures of governance supporting developing states, and function as a critical component in upholding power structures.

This interpretation of indirect rule and competition – or violence ‘management’ – transcends the supplementary, replacement, delegation, accountability, and capacity arguments to instead emphasize that informal, private armed groups are a necessary component of modern governance where political competition is lethal, positions on government hierarchies are determined by coercive potential and force, and the state is actually a collection of often competing interests and agendas (see De Waal, 2009). Indeed, Ahram (2014) suggests that regardless of the institutional character of the state (e.g. autocratic, semi-democratic, or otherwise), governments augment their capacity for coercion with groups who are a critical component of everyday governance; in such countries, this amounts to collaboration with non-state agents. These are characteristics common in autocratic states and those with defunct democracies (Svolik, 2012), and almost all African states fall into these categories of ‘low capacity’ and irregular institutions.

Violence ‘management’ of diverse interests and agendas through a network of associated groups with whom the regime has stronger or weaker alliances suggests that militias are not exclusively – or even primarily – created to deal with state ‘crisis’, but rather perform a significant role in ‘banal’ governance (Ahram, 2014). Militias perform critical functions for the regime during war, and are active participants in crisis (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger, 2015b), but they exist and persist too in non-crisis situations. For example, the ZANU-PF of Zimbabwe is the main conflict agent in that state within and between contested elections and the like. The CNDD of Burundi persisted well after the end of the civil war in 2005, and in 2014, reports of a new youth wing – the Imbonerakure – allowed the regime to secure its position in power despite large-scale public protest. Other examples include the FRELIMO militia in Mozambique and Muslim Brotherhood activity in Egypt during President Morsi’s tenure. This abbreviated list demonstrates the commonality of PGM actions outside of war contexts, and the multiple domestic contexts (e.g. post-war, post-revolution, fragmented polity, or state repression) in which they operate. PGMs are responsible for roughly the same proportion of fatalities during civil war (i.e. crisis) periods (approximately 5% of all fatalities stemming from organized, armed violence) as they are outside of these periods (approximately 7% of fatalities).

But despite the rich contextual interpretation of militias and their role in management, it does not address why some states have come to engage with these groups instead of building stable and sufficiently powerful armed forces and formal local security networks. To address this, Ahram (2011b) and Firsch (2002) correlate the use of non-traditional violence agents to the nature of threats and the resultant effect on decentralized, fragmented, and purposefully segmented security forces. African regimes face a higher risk of internal over external threats: domestic threats can be both internal to the governance structures and hierarchies (e.g. coups from military or party forces) as well as external to the government (e.g. civil wars, elections). Internal government threats have been a greater concern to African leaders – in the form of coups, purges, putschs, and mutinies – than civil wars, which are still relatively uncommon phenomena (Roessler, 2011). This internal risk is exacerbated in states with recent histories of one-party dominance and limited party or external competition. Since the avenues for competition through democratic elections are still often severely curtailed, competition becomes internal to parties, regimes, and governments. Effectively, political competition has been relocated to within internal governance structures.

To mitigate or lessen the threat from the military or otherwise aligned internal forces, regimes and their leaders have thought it necessary to decentralize security forces, thereby limiting the ability of the military to overwhelm the executive. Barany (2011), when commenting on the variation in North African and Middle Eastern leadership and survival during the Arab Spring, finds many

leaders “come from a military and security background themselves, and usually divide the armed forces into separate entities that must compete for resources and influence...they often command them personally or through trusted family members” (p.25). As a result, multiple, overlapping agencies are accountable to various members of the government, and become ‘their’ force: some examples include the presidential guard (often populated by soldiers from the home area of the President); intelligence forces with no security relationship (as seen in Pakistan, Kenya, and Zimbabwe); ‘anti-terrorist’ units; and the often poorly paid and coordinated army and police forces. The result, according to Hills (2000), is that “African armies bear little resemblance to the Western organizational prototype, being more akin to armed camps owing clientalist allegiances to a few officers, tends to be overlooked, as does the strength of neopatrimonialism” (p.2). Further, she records:

“In Nigeria...policing must be understood in relation to the activities of the military, some eight or more paramilitary units, various palace guards, numerous quasi-official units in various states and miscellaneous thugs associated with strongmen... [And] the creation of special units may also confuse relationships, with presidential guards, republican guards, general service units, paramilitary or intelligence units and informal networks of spies acting as counterweights to the regular forces. President Nkrumah, for instance, distrusted both the police and the army, who with their adherence to British traditions of professionalism and impartiality, could not fulfill his security needs. Accordingly, he created a complex civilian-military security force, the National Security Service (NSS), which was directly responsible to him. He also deliberately encouraged police-military competition” (2000, p.6-7).

These episodes and examples reinforce the view that the “frequent reshaping of security forces in line with the directives of new heads of state creates a loyal core, but a frustrated mass, of security forces” (Mehler, 2012, p. 50). This is why informal forces operate in conjunction with formal, fragmented forces.

Mehler (2012) confirms that unbalanced Special Forces and dominance of a few ethnic groups characterize African militaries. For example, in the Central African Republic, former President Kolingba created an armed force from his own minority group (Yakima), while other Presidents – notably President Patasse – increased the presidential guard relative to all other forces. Infighting amongst the security services continues in states in part because of the favored and polarizing conditions of some sectors over others, but also anarchical recruitment, an absence of basic training, barracks, and equipment (Mehler, 2012). Further, the politicization of defense and security forces and the use of non-conventional forces suggest, “the heteroclitite composition of the security forces would lead to the absence of cohesion and discipline” (Mehler, 2012, p.58).

The reasoning behind the multiplication of forces is that should any political elite challenge the regime with mutinous troops from one segment of the security forces, others would be able to counter and protect the established regime. Poorly coordinated and decentralized political forces are frequently found in states, including those with violent liberation histories (e.g. Zimbabwe) as well as those without (e.g. Nigeria, Sudan); in states with present or recent civil wars (e.g. DR-Congo); and in those without these specific forms of threat (e.g. Kenya). In all cases, PGMs are operational. In contrast, those few African states which face a greater threat from outside rather than inside their borders are uniformly regarded as operating strong, centralized, and effective forces – such as those present in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Egypt – and are associated with fewer PGMs and less need for them.

Indeed, different threats result in varying effective roles by security services. While internal regime threats can be repressed by multiple forces, Barany (2011) notes that the likelihood of surviving popular – rather than internal (i.e. coups) – regime challenges is strongly related to security services that are centralized and “cooperate rather than distrust each other, and that are free from internal cleavages (over regime performance, for instance)...and should likewise be more steadfast in defending the established order” (p. 26). The outcome of the Arab Spring across affected states varied in accordance with the relationship of regimes to armed forces and associated groups: in Tunisia, infighting and limited political influence of the army made those troops less likely to support the regime; in Egypt, the army saw an opportunity to replace Mubarak after popular support, despite holding a privileged position under him; in both Yemen and Libya, political influence was tribal, local, and relationship-based. Barany notes:

“In Libya, the military and security establishment was divided into numerous organizations that had little contact with each other...Gaddafi's response to the revolt against him was to unleash half dozen or so paramilitary organizations against his opponents. These security units rather than the regular military were the regime's first line of defence” (2011, p.29).

As expected, in Yemen, former President Saleh relied on “better equipped and trained Republican Guard, Central Security Forces and elite army units, whose loyalty he retained” (Barany, 2011, p. 29). The clear divisions in military and security forces reflected the deep-seated fragmentation in their respective societies and elite power structures.

The Arab Spring is instructive in why certain leaders did not capitulate, despite internal power battles: in Syria and Bahrain, while military forces may have had serious issues with their treatment or the type of governance they were asked to defend, the polarization around identities insured these leaders greater latitude and support from forces often representing particular groups. As differences came down to the polarization around ethnic or religious divisions, more centralized support for the regimes emerged and bolstered both leaders to continue. In societies with heterogeneous political identities – including ethnic, regional, and religious affiliations – political elites within regimes support and bolster their power by associating with an armed organization; this leads to a proliferation of groups designed to protect elites over providing internal or external communities. In societies with fewer groups but polarized identities, a regime that represents one of the few identities will coordinate to secure stability, acting as if other identity groups function like external threats (Ethiopia and Rwanda are ready examples of this similar phenomena). In homogenous societies, security forces are integrated into a largely apolitical administration, thereby operating on behalf of the regime and state (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Botswana).

Hence, PGMs are an equal and separate component of purposefully decentralized and overlapping forces, and are used for a specific purpose therein. While there are multiple official agencies that – to a greater or lesser degree – can deal with threats to the state (e.g. rebel forces), PGMs are used by governing political elites to combat personal, party, and departmental competition. This would imply that a state leader(s) uses PGMs when alternative political contenders compromise his/her personal power or position. The political heterogeneity of the state provides an effective measure of the complex environments in which regimes are operating and therefore the likelihood that multiple official and unofficial security services – including PGMs – are likely to arise.

Therefore, we suggest that:

Hypothesis 3a: Higher levels of PGM activity are found in ethnically heterogeneous states.

Hypothesis 3b: During times when competition between political powers is high (i.e. election periods), more PGMs are operational.

Hypothesis 3c: PGMs agent numbers and activity is correlated to the number and activity level of armed, active, named opposition groups.

Data

In order to account for the intricacies of the ties between PGMs and the state, we create a new pro-government militia dataset in which we identify three types of PGMs based on the strength of their relationship to the state and the patron of that relationship. This wider understanding of what may constitute a PGM is important when examining the conflict dynamics of these actors.

We first isolate all militias coded in the ACLED data project. These are distinguished as ‘political’ or ‘communal’ (or ethno-regional) groups. The individual groups are then investigated to determine whether they have a reported pro-government affiliation. If so, the type of affiliation is determined. Each PGM operates in line with what is broadly understood as a context-specific role, whether locally (i.e. communal, co-ethnic relationship with regimes), politically (i.e. tie to a high-ranking politician, including the President), or a noted alliance to the military forces of the state. Militias that are reported to have allied with state forces at any point are specified as having pro-government affiliations in our PGM dataset. Ethnic militias sharing an ethnic affiliation with the President are coded as having pro-government ties in line with notions that patronage politics so often lie along ethnic cleavages in Africa (for example, see: Eifert, Miguel, and Posner, 2010). Table 3 describes the conflict activity of these various PGMs.

Table 3. PGM Conflict Involvement by Type of PGM, Africa, 1997-2014.

	Battles	Remote Violence	Violence against Civilians
PGMs having an allied association with state forces	46.1%	1.1%	52.8%
PGMs with a political link to the regime or President	43.7%	1.2%	55.1%
PGMs with regional or ethnic ties to the regime or President	58.1%	0.5%	41.4%

A total of 247 unique PGMs are included in our dataset due to being active in Africa between 1997 and 2014. As comparison, 81 unique PGMs are included in the Carey et al. (2013) dataset as having been active across Africa between 1997 and 2007 (the Carey et al. [2013] dataset covers PGMs across the world from 1981 to 2007); during this time period, we have 124 unique PGMs included as having been active across the continent. While many of the PGMs here and included in Carey et al.’s (2013) dataset overlap, there are differences in spatial coverage. For example, between 1997 and 2007 – the overlapping years of coverage between our dataset and Carey et al.’s (2013) – approximately 14% of all organized, armed conflict in Kenya involved PGMs; 10 unique PGMs are coded as being active in the country during this time. A number of these groups are especially active in late 2007, following the declaration of President Kibaki as winner of the election. By contrast, only 3 unique PGMs are coded in Carey et al.’s (2013) dataset during this time in Kenya, none of which are reported as having been active in 2007. Groups that exist in Carey et al.’s (2013) PGM dataset are crosschecked against conflict actors that are listed within the ACLED dataset; groups who share (similar) names and dates of conflict activity are included in our dataset as having a

political link to the regime or President. Groups that have a stated link to the regime or President in media sources are also categorized as pro-government here.

Our unit of observation in exploring the conflict patterns of PGMs is location-month; name and geographic coordinates identify a location. Conflict data come from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project (Raleigh et al., 2010), from which we extracted armed, organized conflict events. Each event occurs in one of the 15,293 unique locations included in ACLED. We then aggregated the daily events into the month in which they occurred. The result is a total of 50,892 location-month observations across the African continent between 1997 and 2014.⁴

Data capturing heterogeneity as a function of ethno-political relevance are from the Georeferenced Ethnic Groups (GREG; Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman, 2010), Ethnologue (Grimes et al., 1999), and the Georeferenced Ethnic Power Relations (GeoEPR; Vogt et al., forthcoming) datasets. Differences among the datasets and their spatial coverage are discussed in further detail in the Appendix.


Election periods refer to the 12 months before and the 12 months after an election month (i.e. a 25-month period). Figure 3 depicts the level of violence across Africa during an election period (i.e. pre, during, and post-election). These data are coded using information from the African Elections Database (2015), which in turn collates data drawing on information from sources including National Election Authorities, official government documents, Electoral Observer Mission reports, and online newspapers and media, amongst others.

Additional data are also included as controls. Whether or not a state is a ‘democracy’ is included here as literature suggests that more democratic states see less instances of armed conflict, while more autocratic states see more (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, 2001); these data are based on regime type categorizations by the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Prior conflict is also included as a control here as the prior onset of conflict can have an effect on the likelihood of future conflict onset. Control variables are included accounting for both prior conflict seen in a location’s immediate surrounding area (i.e. the administrative region within which a location exists) – which could impact local PGM activity – as well as prior conflict seen in bordering countries – which could impact the conflict activity of state forces; these conflict data are based on ACLED data. A control variable is included accounting for whether a location is a capital city. Lastly, annual state population is used as a proxy for state productivity; these data come from the World Bank Development Indicators (2015) and are logged for analysis.⁵

⁴ Conflict events are coded as daily, georeferenced, actor-specific occurrences in ACLED, and include neither a fatality-based threshold for inclusion nor pre-defined conflict distinctions, allowing for the inclusion of a wider variety of violence carried out by PGMs relative to other similar datasets. Further details of ACLED sourcing, coding, and methodology can be found on their methodology page (ACLED, 2015).

⁵ This population variable is highly correlated with annual state GDP, so both variables could not be included in all models (correlation: 0.79). As Somalia lacks GDP information, a population measure was included in models instead of GDP in order to ensure that Somalia was kept in all models for analysis. All models are re-run using an annual state GDP measure instead of the population measure as a robustness check; these population and GDP data come from the World Bank Development Indicators (2015) and are logged for analysis. All results and findings (e.g. statistical significance, direction of relationship, etc.) remain the same regardless of which variable is used; models with the GDP variable can be found in the Appendix.

Figure 3. Armed Organized Violence during the Election Period, Africa, 1997-2014.



Results

Nine negative binomial and OLS regression models test the various hypotheses. These results are discussed below, and 38 robustness check models are included in the Appendix.

Capacity

In order to test Hypothesis 1 – the capacity argument for the use of PGMs – a model is run measuring the proportion of conflict events involving PGMs in periods and locations where state military performance and presence is low. The capacity argument for the use of PGMs contends that in times and spaces that state forces exhibit low military performance and presence (and is hence less expansive), there ought to be a higher degree of conflict activity involving PGMs as these groups carry out the violence that the state does not have the capacity to carry out itself.

Model 1 tests Hypothesis 1 by examining the effect of low state military activity on the rate of PGM conflict events. The model finds a statistically significant and positive effect for proportionally higher PGM conflict activity in times and spaces with low state military activity; these results can be found in Table 4. Please refer to the Appendix to see robustness checks further supporting this finding. This provides support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that PGMs can be used to carry out conflict activity in times and spaces that the state lacks the capacity to do so itself.

Table 4. Results for Hypothesis 1.

VARIABLES	(1) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events
Low State Conflict Activity	0.0338*** (0.00319)
Population (logged)	0.00479** (0.00203)
Democracy	-0.0253*** (0.00344)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	2.12e-06*** (6.44e-07)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00109*** (0.000100)
Capital City	-0.0857*** (0.0242)
Constant	0.0115 (0.0343)
Observations	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

The marginal difference between PGM conflict activity in a location where state military activity is low versus a location where it is not, however, is not great. A location where state military activity is low sees 0.121 PGM conflict activities a month, while a location that is not where state military activity is low sees 0.087 conflict activities a month, a difference of only about 0.034 PGM conflict events.

This begs the question: why are PGMs kept distinct from state military forces to carry out violence in these times and spaces as opposed to being absorbed by the military if their function is to simply further state capacity? Furthermore, why do so many distinct PGMs exist? The accountability theory argues that these groups are kept separate in order to distance state forces from responsibility for particular brutal or shameful acts of violence (e.g. increasingly lethal civilian targeting).

Accountability

Hypothesis 2 tests the accountability argument for the use of PGMs. This theory contends that civilian targeting ought to be overwhelmingly carried out by PGMs. A paired t-test, however, suggests that there is no difference between the use of violence against civilians as a tactic by state forces ($M=0.116$, $SD=0.002$) versus by PGMs ($M=0.117$, $SD=0.577$); $t(50,981)=0.3165$, $p=0.7516$. Model 2 finds that as the proportion of state conflict events that are comprised of civilian targeting increases, so too does the proportion of PGM conflict events that are comprised of civilian targeting, suggesting that one does not replace the other. These results are presented in Table 5, and

Table 5. Results for Hypothesis 2.

VARIABLES	(2) Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs as a Proportion of All PGM Events	(3) Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs	(4) Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces
Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces as a Proportion of All State Events	0.530*** (0.0263)		
Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces		-0.0395*** (0.00516)	
Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs			-0.000268 (0.00248)
Population (logged)	-0.00869 (0.0106)	0.108*** (0.0328)	0.131*** (0.0275)
Democracy	-0.0103 (0.0185)	0.123* (0.0667)	-0.213*** (0.0582)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	8.27e-06*** (1.69e-06)	0.000109*** (6.62e-06)	5.24e-05*** (4.78e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.000878** (0.000441)	0.00672*** (0.00160)	0.0113*** (0.00135)
Capital City	0.00143 (0.0475)	-1.468*** (0.283)	0.278*** (0.106)
Constant	0.301* (0.183)	-5.521*** (0.566)	-6.130*** (0.476)
Observations	1,771	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	878	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

do not offer support for Hypothesis 2a. Please refer to the Appendix to see a number of models used as robustness checks further supporting this finding.

The accountability argument for the use of PGMs also contends that civilian targeting that is carried out by PGMs ought to be more lethal than civilian targeting that is carried out by state forces themselves, as a result of the high degree of accountability surrounding the activity of state forces; arguably, this is why state forces seek out PGMs to carry out these events. A one-tailed paired t-test, however, finds that instances of violence against civilians perpetrated by state forces ($M=0.466$, $SD=0.065$) are in fact *more* lethal than those perpetrated by PGMs ($M=0.348$, $SD=0.042$); $t(50,981)=-1.5270$, $p=0.0634$. This refutes Hypothesis 2b.

Models 3 and 4 explore the relationship between the lethality of civilian targeting carried out by the state versus that which is carried out by PGMs. Model 3 finds that an increase in the number of fatalities resulting from violence against civilians perpetrated by state forces has an effect of reducing the number of fatalities resulting from violence against civilians perpetrated by PGMs, suggesting that the state is able to carry out these shameful actions itself. Model 4, however, finds that the number of fatalities resulting from violence against civilians perpetrated by PGMs has no effect on the number of fatalities resulting from violence against civilians perpetrated by state forces, suggesting that these groups are not carrying out these actions in order to unburden the state from carrying these out itself.

The highest number of civilian fatalities perpetrated by state forces in our dataset occurred in Sudan during July 2002 (2,666 fatalities total); the highest number of civilian fatalities perpetrated by PGMs in the dataset also occurred in Sudan (1,200 fatalities), in August 2003 carried out by the Janjaweed. The fact that the state carried out this particularly brutal violence itself in mid-2002 – during a time period when PGMs forces, such as the Janjaweed, were especially active and hence could have carried out this violence on the state's behalf instead – suggests that accountability is not at the forefront of reasons why the state may choose to employ PGMs. These findings refute Hypothesis 2b, and can be found in Table 5. Please refer to the Appendix to see a number of models used as robustness checks further supporting this finding.

If not used to carry out particular shameful actions in order to allow the state to remain unaccountable, then why are PGMs employed to carry out violence by the state at all?

Governance and Institutions

Our institutional 'violence management' argument contends that PGMs are used to carry out competition amongst elites who comprise and vie for increased institutional power; hence, in increasingly competitive societies, conflict involving these proxy agents will be more prevalent.

To test Hypothesis 3 on institutional 'violence management', five models are run measuring the prevalence of conflict activity involving PGMs in states with high levels of institutional competition, measured as: high ethno-political heterogeneity; periods of heightened political competition; and periods of high threat to the state.

Models 5 through 7 test Hypothesis 3a, which argues that relatively higher levels of PGM activity are found in ethnically heterogeneous locations. We use three different ethnic heterogeneity variables (based on data from GREG, Ethnologue, and GeoEPR) to ensure robustness. All three models find

Table 6. Results for Hypothesis 3.

VARIABLES	(5) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(6) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(7) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(8) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(9) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events
Election Period (12 months before & after election month)				0.0162*** (0.00294)	
Number of Named Conflict Agents Against the State					0.000911*** (0.000214)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)	0.00595*** (0.000318)			0.00609*** (0.000319)	0.00580*** (0.000320)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)		0.000407*** (2.51e-05)			
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)			0.00630*** (0.000414)		
Population (logged)	-0.0309*** (0.00277)	-0.0215*** (0.00258)	-0.0125*** (0.00231)	-0.0318*** (0.00277)	-0.0308*** (0.00277)
Democracy	-0.0211*** (0.00343)	-0.0289*** (0.00345)	-0.0263*** (0.00344)	-0.0221*** (0.00344)	-0.0251*** (0.00356)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	2.54e-06*** (6.42e-07)	3.19e-06*** (6.44e-07)	2.40e-06*** (6.42e-07)	2.69e-06*** (6.42e-07)	2.29e-06*** (6.45e-07)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.000884*** (0.000100)	0.000998*** (0.000100)	0.000897*** (0.000101)	0.000897*** (0.000100)	0.000765*** (0.000104)
Capital City	-0.0837*** (0.0241)	-0.0873*** (0.0242)	-0.0790*** (0.0242)	-0.0835*** (0.0241)	-0.0804*** (0.0241)
Constant	0.559*** (0.0438)	0.454*** (0.0425)	0.270*** (0.0372)	0.568*** (0.0438)	0.555*** (0.0437)
Observations	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

statistically significant support for Hypothesis 3a: increased ethnic heterogeneity in a state contributes to a larger proportion of PGM events occurring; these results are presented in Table 6.⁶ Please refer to the Appendix to see a number of models used as robustness checks further supporting this finding.

Locations in a more heterogeneous society – such as those in DR-Congo or Nigeria, both at the maximum level ethnic heterogeneity seen in the dataset – see over six times as much conflict involving PGMs in an average month relative to those in a more homogenous society – such as locations in Lesotho or Madagascar, both at the minimum level of ethnic heterogeneity seen in the dataset – holding all else constant at their means. A specific location in a society with an average number of ethnic communities – such as locations in Mali or Angola – sees over three times as much conflict involving PGMs in an average month relative to those in a more homogeneous society, holding all else constant at their means. These marginal effects are outlined in Table 7.

Hypothesis 3b contends that during election periods when competition between political powers is heightened, PGMs will be increasingly operational as a result of this competition. Model 8 finds that election periods (i.e. the 25-month period that encompasses the twelve months before and after an election month, in addition to the election month itself) see a larger proportion of PGM events occurring relative to non-election periods; these results are also presented in Table 6. Please refer to the Appendix to see a number of models, in which the definition of an ‘election period’ is varied, used as robustness checks further supporting this finding.

The difference between the conflict environment during versus outside of election periods is stark: during an election period, locations experience almost three times as much conflict involving PGMs relative to a non-election period, holding all else constant at their means. These marginal effects are outlined in Table 7.

Lastly, Model 9 tests Hypothesis 3c – that relatively higher levels of PGM activity are found when there is an increased threat to the state – and finds that increases in the number of armed, active, named opposition groups contesting the state are coupled with a larger proportion of PGM events occurring; these results are also presented in Table 6. Please refer to the Appendix to see a number of models used as robustness checks further supporting this finding.

Table 7. Marginal Effects of Institutional Competition Variables.

	Minimum	Maximum	Marginal Difference
Count of Ethnic Communities	0.037	0.233	0.196
Election Periods	-0.080	0.140	0.220
Threats Against the State	0.106	0.136	0.030

⁶ While all three ethnic heterogeneity variables are presented here in Models 5 through 7, the marginal effects discussed below make use of the GREG variable. Furthermore, in the following models testing Hypotheses 3b and 3c, the GREG variable is used as a control for ethnic heterogeneity. However, as a robustness check, all models are re-run using the Ethnologue and GeoEPR variables in place of the GREG variable as a control, and all models yield similar results. These models are included in the Appendix.

For example, a number of locations in Somalia see 33 distinct, named conflict actors taking up arms against the state during much of 2014 – this is the maximum number of agents against the state in a given month seen in the dataset. These places see proportionally more conflict involving PGMs than locations in Somalia which see 0 distinct, named conflict actors against the state – as is the case during much of 1998 – 0 is the minimum number of agents against the state in a given month in the dataset. These marginal effects are outlined in Table 7.⁷

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Militias are informal violent organizations designed to perpetuate conflict for purposes that conform to regime agendas. PGMs are a subsection of this community who engage in conflict, often against civilians, to protect or strengthen the power of the regime and associated politicians in developing states. They represent an informal structure of conflict that mirrors the formal security structure in states. Much of the literature on these organizations contend that their emergence and use is primarily a function of (1) capacity, where PGMs arise in order to carry out violence in the spaces where the state does not have the ability to do so itself, and (2) accountability, as PGMs conduct offenses that governments cannot or do not want to be deemed accountable for. We discount this ‘delegation’ lens to explain the presence of these organizations, and instead extend an explanation that is based on the threat type and level that governments experience from domestic competition, including that internal to the government. This reading of PGM violence as an extension of competition internal to governance processes in patronage states is in line with Mazzei (2009) on Latin America, Ahram (2011a, 2011b, 2014) on the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and Raleigh (2014a) on Africa.

These groups are critical to a shared interpretation of conflict environments for several reasons: they represent an important and growing fixture of modern conflict; they are most active outside of civil war periods, in the poorly-defined and researched ‘domestic instability’ sphere; they allow governments to perpetuate intense and fatal violence without direct attribution or sanction; they have become central to the ‘normalized’ political violence that affects developing states; and, they are the main modality of violence through which ‘inclusive’ political violence – or elite competition – is experienced. In consequence, the ways in which multiple formal and informal violence and security organizations characterize modern African states is another challenge to the contention that states should aspire to, and benefit from, a monopoly of violence. Many African and developing states have political environments that can be aptly characterized as ‘oligopolies’ of violence.

In line with Ahram, who argues that the role of militias is based on an interaction between “structural conditions, actors’ strategic calculations, and the set of available repertoires” (2014, p.497), we also find that PGMs differ in their mandate, largely in line with the needs of their ‘patron’ political figure. Further, PGMs emerge from the administration and security structures of the state. In turn, these structures are shaped by the nature and number of threats to regime power.

In contexts and periods where political competition is highest, such as in ethnically heterogeneous locations or during election periods, these groups are active in association with state forces. They operate as supplements to particular branches and elites in governments, as the internal fractures within developing countries’ institutional structures is often significant and exerts a far greater threat

⁷ Unidentified armed groups are not included in counts of armed agents against the state; only named groups are included in analysis here.

to the stability of the state than external threats. Indeed, these internal feuds and the mistrust within branches of government are often a more serious challenge than from outside the regime, typically conceptualized as rebels or insurgents. Internal government threats have been a greater concern to African leaders – in the form of coups, purges, putschs, and mutinies – than civil wars, which are still relatively uncommon phenomena (Roessler, 2011).

Appendix

Capacity

Models A1 through A4 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 1. Model A1 duplicates Model 1, with only the logged population variable changed to a logged annual state GDP variable. These findings mimic those found in Model 1, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable.

Model A2 duplicates Model 1, with only the dependent variable changed from the proportion of all conflict events made up by PGM events in a given location to the total gross number of PGM events in a given location. Again, these findings mimic those found in Model 1, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the transformation of the dependent variable, but rather are driven by the effect of low state conflict activity on shaping PGM conflict activity patterns.

Table A1. Robustness Models for Hypothesis 1.

VARIABLES	(A1) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A2) Number of PGM Events	(A3) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A4) Number of PGM Events
State with Low State Conflict Activity	0.0344*** (0.00355)	0.357*** (0.0331)		
Number of State Conflict Events			-0.0184*** (0.000875)	-0.157*** (0.0104)
Population (logged)		-0.0153 (0.0176)	0.00440** (0.00202)	-0.0167 (0.0174)
GDP (logged)	-0.00947*** (0.00125)			
Democracy	-0.00868** (0.00405)	-0.195*** (0.0313)	-0.0223*** (0.00343)	-0.174*** (0.0314)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	2.21e-06*** (6.71e-07)	7.18e-05*** (2.83e-06)	8.58e-06*** (7.03e-07)	9.17e-05*** (2.74e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00131*** (0.000115)	0.0143*** (0.000751)	0.00123*** (0.000100)	0.0148*** (0.000761)
Capital City	-0.0982*** (0.0246)	-1.190*** (0.125)	-0.0791*** (0.0240)	-0.954*** (0.123)
Constant	0.311*** (0.0295)	-0.0190 (0.298)	0.0482 (0.0339)	0.260 (0.293)
Observations	42,633	48,971	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	13,541	14,801	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models A3 and A4 duplicate Models 1 and A2, with only the state conflict activity variable changed from a dummy variable capturing low state conflict activity to the gross number of state conflict events occurring in a given location. Again, these findings mimic those found in Models 1 and A2: there is a negative relationship between the number of state conflict events that occur in a given location and the proportion of and number of PGM events that occur. This suggests that findings here are not driven by the transformation of the state conflict variable, but rather are driven by the effect of state conflict activity patterns on PGM conflict. These robustness models further supporting findings surrounding Hypothesis 1 can all be found in Table A1.

Accountability

Models A5 through A8 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 2a. Model A5 duplicates Model 2, with only the logged population variable changed to a logged annual state GDP variable. These findings mimic those found in Model 2, again suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable.

Models A6 through A8 duplicate Model 2, with only the transformation of the dependent variable changing. In Model A6, the dependent variable changes from the proportion of all PGM events made up by civilian targeting in a given location to the proportion of all armed conflict events made up by civilian targeting perpetrated by PGMs in a given location. In Model A7, the dependent variable changes to the proportion of all conflict events made up by civilian targeting perpetrated by PGMs in a given location. Lastly, the dependent variable in Model A8 changes to the total gross number of violence against civilians events perpetrated by PGMs in a given location. The findings from all three of these models mimic those found in Model 2, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the transformation of the dependent variable. These robustness models further supporting findings surrounding Hypothesis 2a can all be found in Table A2.

Models A9 and A10 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 2b. These two models duplicate Models 3 and 4, respectively, with only the logged population variables changed to logged annual state GDP variables. These findings mimic those found in Models 3 and 4, respectively, again suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable. These robustness models further supporting findings surrounding Hypothesis 2b can be found in Table A3.

Governance and Institutions

There are a variety of datasets offering measures for ethnic heterogeneity within a society, including GREG (Weidmann et al., 2010), Ethnologue (Grimes et al., 1999), and GeoEPR (Vogt et al., forthcoming). Using GeoEPR alone – the most prevalently used dataset measuring ethno-politics in recent studies – to map ethnic power relations across Africa is not sufficient. While the dataset is an important step in creating geographical data for ethnic communities, it has several shortcomings in the Africa set, mainly stemming from its base map. The Atlas Mirodov is a poor representation of ethnicity in Africa, as it is a study from the 1960s, using a solely linguistic basis for distinction, and does not consider the multiple identities (geographical, ethnic, linguistic) of an average African. Hence the result is a map that does not identify many key groups, and aggregates other communities based on linguistics (when they are distinct politically).

Table A2. Robustness Models for Hypothesis 2a.

VARIABLES	(A5)	(A6)	(A7)	(A8)
	Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs as a Proportion of All PGM Events	Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs as a Proportion of All Armed Conflict Events	Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs
Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces as a Proportion of All State Events	0.552*** (0.0267)	0.0252*** (0.00207)	0.0262*** (0.00138)	0.919*** (0.102)
Population (logged)		0.00283*** (0.000759)	0.00140*** (0.000476)	0.134** (0.0614)
GDP (logged)	0.00956 (0.00710)			
Democracy	-0.0162 (0.0193)	0.00188 (0.00160)	-0.00108 (0.000998)	0.0141 (0.0997)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	7.41e-06*** (1.69e-06)	1.83e-06*** (2.74e-07)	9.81e-07*** (1.86e-07)	8.43e-05*** (9.72e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00155*** (0.000465)	0.000272*** (4.57e-05)	0.000304*** (3.07e-05)	0.0202*** (0.00208)
Capital City	0.0254 (0.0473)	0.0157*** (0.00306)	0.00124 (0.00173)	0.457** (0.220)
Constant	-0.0813 (0.169)	-0.0432*** (0.0128)	-0.0210*** (0.00806)	-4.572*** (1.050)
Observations	1,591	17,670	21,948	21,948
Number of Groups	805	6,431	7,673	7,673

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Robustness Models for Hypothesis 2b.

VARIABLES	(A9) Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs	(A10) Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces
Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by State Forces	-0.0368*** (0.00528)	
Fatalities Resulting from Violence Against Civilians Perpetrated by PGMs		-0.000136 (0.00239)
Population (logged)		
GDP (logged)	0.0540*** (0.0200)	0.0322* (0.0176)
Democracy	0.112 (0.0717)	-0.387*** (0.0655)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	0.000104*** (6.94e-06)	5.20e-05*** (5.20e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00816*** (0.00163)	0.00354** (0.00177)
Capital City	-1.469*** (0.282)	0.280** (0.109)
Constant	-4.963*** (0.470)	-4.650*** (0.421)
Observations	42,633	42,633
Number of Groups	13,541	13,541

Standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Ethnologue produces an updated map of ethno-linguistic homelands that is based on on-going analysis of community boundaries, and absolute and relative identities. Its breakdown of political groups is more in line with modern interpretations of African ethnic breakdowns by state, though it does not explicitly code political identities. Its maps, however, can be easily associated with Scarritt and Mozaffar's scaled, political identity ethnic group list for African states; these two datasets are much more similar to each other than either is to GeoEPR. As African scholars oversaw the creation of these, they are more thorough, updated, and reliable sources of African ethnic communities and homelands than GeoEPR.

In order to ensure that the effect of ethnic heterogeneity is not a function of the dataset selected, all models including an ethnic heterogeneity variable are re-run to include all ethnic heterogeneity variables described here.

Models A11 through A13 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 3a, duplicating Models 5, 6, and 7, respectively, with only the logged population variables changed to logged annual state GDP variables. These findings mimic those found in Models 5 through 7, again suggesting that findings

here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable. These results can be found in Table A4.

Table A4. Robustness Models for Hypothesis 3a.

VARIABLES	(A11)	(A12)	(A13)
	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)	0.00448*** (0.000267)		
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)		0.000364*** (2.18e-05)	
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)			0.00526*** (0.000400)
GDP (logged)	-0.0160*** (0.00130)	-0.0174*** (0.00132)	-0.0103*** (0.00125)
Democracy	-0.0128*** (0.00405)	-0.0155*** (0.00407)	-0.0176*** (0.00413)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	2.54e-06*** (6.69e-07)	3.15e-06*** (6.70e-07)	2.39e-06*** (6.69e-07)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00110*** (0.000115)	0.00120*** (0.000114)	0.00110*** (0.000115)
Capital City	-0.0791*** (0.0245)	-0.0875*** (0.0245)	-0.0803*** (0.0246)
Constant	0.429*** (0.0295)	0.500*** (0.0305)	0.308*** (0.0294)
Observations	42,633	42,633	42,633
Number of Groups	13,541	13,541	13,541

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models A14 through A30 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 3b. Models A14 and A15 duplicate Model 8, with only the ethnic heterogeneity variable changed from the GREG variable to Ethnologue and GeoEPR, respectively. These findings mimic those found in Model 8, suggesting that findings are not driven by the use of a specific ethnic heterogeneity variable.

Models A16 through A18 duplicate Models 8, A14, and A15, respectively, with only the logged population variables changed to logged annual state GDP variables. These findings mimic those found in Models 8, A14, and A15, again suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable.

Models A19 through A21 duplicate Models 8, A14, and A15, respectively, with only the dependent variable changed from the proportion of all conflict events made up by PGM events in a given location to the total gross number of PGM events in a given location. Again, these findings mimic those found in Models 8, A14, and A15, respectively, suggesting that findings are not driven by the

transformation of the dependent variable, but rather are driven by the effect of institutional competition during election periods on shaping PGM conflict activity patterns.

Models A22 through A30 duplicate Models 8, A14, and A15, with only the election period variable changing to encompass different time periods. Models A22 through A24 see a change in the election period measured as the 25-month period encompassing the 12 months before and after an election month in addition to the election month itself to measured as the 10-month period encompassing the 6 months prior to an election, the election month itself, and the 3 months following an election. Models A25 through A27 see a change in the election period measured as the calendar year of an election, while Models A28 through A30 see a change in the election period measured as the calendar month of an election instead. The findings from all of these various models mimic those found in Models 8, A14, and A15, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the transformation of the election period variable, but rather are driven by the effect of institutional competition on PGM conflict patterns. These robustness models further supporting findings surrounding Hypothesis 3b can be found in Table A5.

Models A31 through A38 offer robustness checks for Hypothesis 3c. Models A31 and A32 duplicate Model 9, with only the ethnic heterogeneity variable changed from the GREG variable to Ethnologue and GeoEPR, respectively. These findings mimic those found in Model 9, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a specific ethnic heterogeneity variable.

Models A33 through A35, duplicate Models 9, A31, and A32, respectively, with only the logged population variables changed to logged annual state GDP variables. These findings mimic those found in Models 9, A31, and A32, respectively, again suggesting that findings here are not driven by the use of a logged population versus GDP variable.

Models A36 through A38 duplicate Models 9, A31, and A32, respectively, with only the dependent variable changed from the proportion of all conflict events made up by PGM events in a given location to the total gross number of PGM events in a given location. Again, these findings mimic those found in Models 9, A31, and A32, respectively, suggesting that findings here are not driven by the transformation of the dependent variable, but rather are driven by the effect of institutional competition measured as threats to the state on shaping PGM conflict activity patterns. These robustness models further supporting findings surrounding Hypothesis 3c can be found in Table A6.

Table A5 (part 1). Robustness Models for Hypothesis 3b.

VARIABLES	(A14)	(A15)	(A16)	(A17)	(A18)	(A19)
	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	Number of PGM Events			
Election Period (12 months before & after election month)	0.0151*** (0.00294)	0.0146*** (0.00294)	0.0158*** (0.00334)	0.0166*** (0.00334)	0.0150*** (0.00334)	0.220*** (0.0276)
Election Period (6 months before & 3 months after election month)						
Election Period (year of election)						
Election Period month of election)						
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)			0.00451*** (0.000267)			0.0439*** (0.00285)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)	0.000415*** (2.52e-05)			0.000368*** (2.18e-05)		
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)		0.00642*** (0.000415)			0.00529*** (0.000400)	
Population (logged)	-0.0221*** (0.00259)	-0.0129*** (0.00231)				-0.303*** (0.0251)
GDP (logged)			-0.0162*** (0.00130)	-0.0177*** (0.00132)	-0.0104*** (0.00125)	
Democracy	-0.0300*** (0.00345)	-0.0274*** (0.00345)	-0.0134*** (0.00405)	-0.0162*** (0.00407)	-0.0182*** (0.00414)	-0.183*** (0.0311)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	3.35e-06*** (6.44e-07)	2.53e-06*** (6.43e-07)	2.67e-06*** (6.69e-07)	3.30e-06*** (6.70e-07)	2.51e-06*** (6.70e-07)	7.42e-05*** (2.65e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.00101*** (0.000100)	0.000909*** (0.000101)	0.00112*** (0.000115)	0.00122*** (0.000114)	0.00112*** (0.000115)	0.0128*** (0.000748)
Capital City	-0.0871*** (0.0242)	-0.0787*** (0.0242)	-0.0790*** (0.0245)	-0.0874*** (0.0245)	-0.0801*** (0.0246)	-1.058*** (0.126)
Constant	0.460*** (0.0425)	0.272*** (0.0372)	0.429*** (0.0295)	0.501*** (0.0305)	0.307*** (0.0294)	4.416*** (0.395)
Observations	48,971	48,971	42,633	42,633	42,633	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801	14,801	13,541	13,541	13,541	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5 (part 2). Robustness Models for Hypothesis 3b.

VARIABLES	(A20) Number of PGM Events	(A21) Number of PGM Events	(A22) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A23) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A24) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A25) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events
Election Period (12 months before & after election month)	0.211*** (0.0277)	0.203*** (0.0276)				
Election Period (6 months before & 3 months after election month)			0.0232*** (0.00376)	0.0229*** (0.00376)	0.0219*** (0.00376)	
Election Period (year of election)						0.0336*** (0.00379)
Election Period month of election)						
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)			0.00605*** (0.000319)			0.00623*** (0.000320)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)	0.00325*** (0.000222)			0.000415*** (2.51e-05)		
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)		0.0341*** (0.00349)			0.00640*** (0.000414)	
Population (logged)	-0.247*** (0.0232)	-0.131*** (0.0207)	-0.0313*** (0.00277)	-0.0218*** (0.00258)	-0.0125*** (0.00231)	-0.0321*** (0.00277)
GDP (logged)						
Democracy	-0.244*** (0.0317)	-0.213*** (0.0312)	-0.0225*** (0.00344)	-0.0305*** (0.00346)	-0.0278*** (0.00345)	-0.0227*** (0.00344)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	7.39e-05*** (2.68e-06)	7.36e-05*** (2.68e-06)	2.64e-06*** (6.42e-07)	3.30e-06*** (6.43e-07)	2.48e-06*** (6.42e-07)	2.69e-06*** (6.42e-07)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.0141*** (0.000744)	0.0131*** (0.000752)	0.000886*** (0.000100)	0.00100*** (0.000100)	0.000899*** (0.000101)	0.000907*** (0.000100)
Capital City	-1.064*** (0.127)	-1.098*** (0.128)	-0.0835*** (0.0241)	-0.0871*** (0.0242)	-0.0787*** (0.0242)	-0.0834*** (0.0241)
Constant	3.875*** (0.381)	1.851*** (0.334)	0.561*** (0.0437)	0.456*** (0.0424)	0.268*** (0.0372)	0.572*** (0.0438)
Observations	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5 (part 3). Robustness Models for Hypothesis 3b.

VARIABLES	(A26)	(A27)	(A28)	(A29)	(A30)
	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events			
Election Period (12 months before & after election month)					
Election Period (6 months before & 3 months after election month)					
Election Period (year of election)	0.0304*** (0.00378)	0.0320*** (0.00379)			
Election Period month of election)			0.0176* (0.00966)	0.0167* (0.00966)	0.0155 (0.00966)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)			0.00596*** (0.000318)		
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)	0.000420*** (2.52e-05)			0.000408*** (2.51e-05)	
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)		0.00664*** (0.000416)			0.00631*** (0.000414)
Population (logged)	-0.0220*** (0.00258)	-0.0129*** (0.00231)	-0.0310*** (0.00277)	-0.0216*** (0.00258)	-0.0125*** (0.00231)
GDP (logged)					
Democracy	-0.0307*** (0.00345)	-0.0282*** (0.00344)	-0.0212*** (0.00344)	-0.0291*** (0.00345)	-0.0265*** (0.00344)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	3.35e-06*** (6.43e-07)	2.53e-06*** (6.42e-07)	2.56e-06*** (6.42e-07)	3.21e-06*** (6.44e-07)	2.41e-06*** (6.42e-07)
Prior Conflict Activity in Adminstrative Region	0.00102*** (0.000100)	0.000919*** (0.000101)	0.000883*** (0.000100)	0.000997*** (0.000100)	0.000896*** (0.000101)
Capital City	-0.0871*** (0.0242)	-0.0785*** (0.0242)	-0.0838*** (0.0241)	-0.0874*** (0.0242)	-0.0791*** (0.0242)
Constant	0.457*** (0.0425)	0.272*** (0.0372)	0.560*** (0.0438)	0.454*** (0.0425)	0.271*** (0.0372)
Observations	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Robustness Models for Hypothesis 3c.

VARIABLES	(A31) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A32) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A33) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A34) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A35) PGM Events as a Proportion of All Conflict Events	(A36) Number of PGM Events	(A37) Number of PGM Events	(A38) Number of PGM Events
Number of Named Conflict Agents Against the State	0.00109*** (0.000214)	0.000998*** (0.000215)	0.00134*** (0.000302)	0.00197*** (0.000287)	0.00163*** (0.000309)	0.00512*** (0.00190)	0.00792*** (0.00190)	0.00620*** (0.00192)
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GREG)			0.00400*** (0.000287)			0.0410*** (0.00288)		
Ethnic Heterogeneity (Ethnologue)	0.000398*** (2.52e-05)			0.000331*** (2.23e-05)			0.00311*** (0.000222)	
Ethnic Heterogeneity (GeoEPR)		0.00609*** (0.000416)			0.00429*** (0.000438)			0.0302*** (0.00355)
Population (logged)	-0.0219*** (0.00258)	-0.0128*** (0.00231)						
GDP (logged)			-0.0170*** (0.00131)	-0.0191*** (0.00134)	-0.0122*** (0.00130)	-0.289*** (0.0252)	-0.245*** (0.0234)	-0.124*** (0.0207)
Democracy	-0.0336*** (0.00357)	-0.0306*** (0.00356)	-0.0136*** (0.00405)	-0.0169*** (0.00407)	-0.0173*** (0.00413)	-0.201*** (0.0328)	-0.274*** (0.0333)	-0.234*** (0.0328)
Prior Conflict Activity in Bordering States	2.87e-06*** (6.46e-07)	2.12e-06*** (6.45e-07)	2.23e-06*** (6.72e-07)	2.65e-06*** (6.73e-07)	2.05e-06*** (6.72e-07)	7.32e-05*** (2.64e-06)	7.29e-05*** (2.67e-06)	7.26e-05*** (2.67e-06)
Prior Conflict Activity in Administrative Region	0.000852*** (0.000104)	0.000768*** (0.000104)	0.000974*** (0.000118)	0.000993*** (0.000118)	0.000956*** (0.000119)	0.0122*** (0.000795)	0.0130*** (0.000795)	0.0124*** (0.000798)
Capital City	-0.0832*** (0.0242)	-0.0755*** (0.0242)	-0.0773*** (0.0245)	-0.0831*** (0.0244)	-0.0788*** (0.0246)	-1.040*** (0.126)	-1.034*** (0.127)	-1.077*** (0.127)
Constant	0.456*** (0.0424)	0.274*** (0.0372)	0.452*** (0.0299)	0.532*** (0.0308)	0.353*** (0.0306)	4.258*** (0.396)	3.880*** (0.383)	1.810*** (0.334)
Observations	48,971	48,971	42,633	42,633	42,633	48,971	48,971	48,971
Number of Groups	14,801	14,801	13,541	13,541	13,541	14,801	14,801	14,801

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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